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Financial services institutions maintain large amounts of data that include both 
intellectual property and personally identifiable information for employees and 
customers.  Due to the potential damage to individuals, government regulators hold 
institutions accountable for ensuring that personal data are protected and require 
reporting of data security breaches. No company wants a data breach, but finding a 
security incident or breach early in the attack cycle may decrease the damage or data loss 
a company experiences. In multiple high profile data breaches reported in major news 
stories over the past few years, there is a pattern of the adversary being inside the 
company’s network for months, and often law enforcement is the first to inform the 
company of the breach.   
The problem that was investigated in this case study was whether new information 
technology (IT) utilized by Fortune 500 financial services companies led to the changes 
in data security incidents and breaches. The goal of this dissertation is to gain a deeper 
understanding on how IT can increase awareness of a security incident or breach, and can 
also decrease security incidents and breaches. This dissertation also explores how threat 
information sharing increases awareness and decreases information security incidents and 
breaches. The objective of the study was to understand how changes in IT can influence 
an increase or decrease in data security breaches.   
This investigation was a case study of nine Fortune 500 financial services companies to 
understand what types of IT increase or decrease detection of security incidents and 
breaches.  An increase in detecting and stopping a security incident or breach may have 
positive effects on the security of an enterprise.  The longer a hacker has access to IT 
systems, the more entrenched they become and the more time the hacker has to locate 
data with high value.  Time is of the essence to detect a compromise and react.  The 
results of the case study showed that Fortune 500 companies utilized new IT that allowed 
them to improve their visibility of security incidents and breaches from months and years 
to hours and days. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
According to the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which consists of the US 
Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, and multiple federal financial services government 
regulators, a key threat and vulnerability of the financial services sector is cyber attacks 
(FSOC, 2015)..  Data security breaches are a concern for financial services companies 
due to the possible impact on customer service, lawsuits, loss of reputation, and 
regulatory penalties (Andoh-Baidoo, Amoako-Gyanpah, & Osei-Bryson, 2010).  
Nevertheless, having a security policy in place does not prevent or reduce such breaches.  
Wiant (2005), Doherty and Fulford (2005), and Heikkila (2009) explored the relationship 
between security policies and data security breaches, and the findings of all three 
investigations demonstrated that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between having a security policy and realizing a reduction in data security breaches.  This 
dissertation was a case study to explore the relationship between information technology 
(IT) and data security breaches and incidents, focused on the Fortune 500 financial 
services sector. 
Data breaches occur in many industry sectors, which underscores how rampant a 
problem data security breaches are.  The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2015) website 
provides a list of publicly disclosed data breaches starting from 2005, demonstrating how 
data breaches affect many sectors, including education, healthcare, and government.  
Universities have identified breaches; for example, the University of Washington in 
November 2013 reported the loss of 90,000 records when a hacker accessed their system.  
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Insurance company breaches include Blue Cross of California, which reported that, in 
November 2013, it exposed 25,400 doctors’ social security numbers (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2015).  Government agencies have experienced data breaches, including 
the New York City Police Department, which reported the loss of 30 passwords from 
police officers when a former police detective paid a hacker to steal their passwords 
(Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015).  In 2013, Target reported a data breach that 
affected 70 million customers, in which the hackers gained access to credit and debit card 
information (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015).  Anthem reported a major data breach 
in 2015, exposing social security numbers and health information of customers.  The 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reported that the actual attack may have started 10 months 
prior to the breach identification.  Some other noteworthy breaches in 2015 included the 
breach of CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield’s 1.1 million records, Premera’s 11 million 
records, Excellus BlueCross BlueShield’s 10 million records, Experian’s 15 million 
records, and ScottTrade’s 4.5 million records as well as the IRS breach of 700,000 
individuals’ records and the U.S. Office of Personal Management’s breach of 21.5 
million records (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015).  Data breaches span Fortune 500 
financial services and many other public and private sector organizations.   
The Ponemon Institute (2014), with the financial support of IBM Corporation, 
conducted an investigation that provided information on the cost of security data breaches.  
Specifically, the Ponemon Institute examined the cost of data breaches among 314 
companies across 10 countries; the average size cost of a data breach per record exposed 
was $145.  In 30% of the data breaches, human error was the cause of the breach.  
Malicious or criminal attacks represented 42% of data breaches, and system glitches that 
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included both IT and business process failures contributed to 29% of the data breaches 
(Ponemon Institute, 2014).  Regulations make it difficult for companies to hide data 
breaches, and investments in information security are not solving the data breach 
challenge.  Caldwell (2014) pointed out that spending to improve cyber defenses, as 
related to the overall IT budget has increased, but the number and impact of breaches also 
are increasing.          
In 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S. SEC; 2011) advised 
publicly held companies registered with the SEC to disclose, in the Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis portion of their SEC filing, details of a cyber attack that could 
disrupt operations as a consequence of additional remediation costs, increased 
cybersecurity protection costs, lost revenue, litigation, or reputational damage (Romeo & 
Parrino, 2012).  In 2015, the U.S. SEC expanded their guidance around cyber security.  
The 2015 guidance urged financial services companies to create a strategy to prevent, 
detect, and respond to cyber security threats.  The guidance also suggested that financial 
services companies conduct assessments of information security data protection, security 
controls, and vulnerability detection systems.  Companies are not required to disclose the 
details of a cyber attack if the disclosure could compromise the registrant’s security 
(Romeo & Parrino, 2012; U.S. SEC, 2011).  Fortune 500 financial services companies are 
regulated to report data breaches that result from cyber attacks.   
Nakashima and Douglas (2013) reported that several banks disclosed security 
incidents, per the SEC guidance regarding the distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks and hacking of the U.S. banking community.  The U.S. government attributed the 
DDoS attacks to the Iranian government in retaliation for sanctions imposed in response 
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to Iran’s nuclear program.  Banks that reported the security attacks to the SEC in their 
annual reports include Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JPMorgan Chase (Nakashima 
& Douglas, 2013).  Nakashima and Douglas pointed out that the executive order on 
cybersecurity that President Obama signed on February 12, 2013, is aimed at helping 
companies that are critical to the nation to provide stronger network security.   
Security regulations and best practices influence the creation of security products.  
Symantec (2010) provided a list of regulations and industry best practices for companies 
to utilize when developing or enhancing their security strategy or investing in security 
products.  McAfee (2013a) showed how their products could help companies to meet a 
wide variety of security regulations.  Further, Cisco (2014a) offers security solutions that 
span firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, and spam filters to improve information 
security technology defenses.  Many products exist for companies to improve their 
information security technology.   
A variety of regulations require a financial services company to report a data security 
breach.  The regulations include state security breach notification laws and federal laws, 
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA; Stevens, 2012).  The Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (2012) released a regulatory notice in 2012, recommending that financial firms 
review their procedures for protecting customer information due to increased fraud 
stemming from malware that compromised customer computers.   
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC; n.d.) regulates and supervises 
national banks and federal savings associations.  The OCC requires the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to produce IT handbooks to be used by the 
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OCC to examine the information security of banks and savings associations (OCC, n.d.).  
Further, many financial services companies issue or utilize credit cards and can be subject 
to the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS; PCI Security Standards 
Council [SSC], 2006; Stevens, 2012).  In 2014, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST; 2014b) released a cyber security framework that is mandatory for 
government-selected critical infrastructure and a guideline for other companies.  
Financial services institutions may be subject to multiple regulations around information 
security and breach notification.    
Gartner defines security information and event management (SIEM) as technology 
that supports threat detection and incident response, using real-time security event data to 
correlate and analyze events (Burnham, 2013).  SIEM technology provides security 
analytics that allow for mining of log data to piece together a picture of a malicious 
security event (Lozito, 2011; Oltsik, 2013).  Gartner publishes their view of the top 
products in a particular area and rates products by their ability to deliver function and an 
articulate product roadmap, and their choice of superior products is called the magic 
quadrant (Burnham, 2013).  For SIEM technology, IBM Q1 labs, HP ArcSight, McAfee 
Nitro, Splunk, and LogRhythm were named to the 2013 Gartner’s magic quadrant 
(Burnham, 2013).   
According to Lozito (2011), SIEM has emerged as a security tool to allow deeper 
analysis of both real-time and historical events.  SIEM enables companies to perform 
security analytics to search for anomalies in log data, providing the capability to locate 
possible compromises (Chickowski, 2011).  Use of SIEM technology could lead 
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institutions to discover security incidents of which they were previously unaware 
(Gabriel, Hoppe, Pastwa, & Sowa, 2009).   
     Nevertheless, as companies change their computing models, new security risks can 
emerge.  For example, cloud technologies are an option that companies can utilize to 
react quickly to evolving business requirements, rather than taking the time to develop 
custom solutions within the company (Sadiku, Musa, & Momoh, 2014).  Many different 
cloud offerings are available, including Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a 
Service (SaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS; Columbus, 2013; Sadiku et al., 2014).  
IaaS provides storage, processing, and network services from the Internet.  An example 
of an IaaS is Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (Sadiku et al., 2014).  PaaS builds upon 
the IaaS capabilities by adding application programming interfaces.  Google AppEngine 
and Microsoft Azure are two examples of PaaS cloud technology (Sadiku et al., 2014).  A 
SaaS is directly consumable by a user, not requiring the company’s IT organization to 
provide customization of the cloud service.  An example of a SaaS is Salesforce (Sadiku 
et al., 2014).   
 New IT can create information security implications.  If the cloud offering is hosted 
external to the company, the level of security responsibility changes, depending on the 
service offering that is chosen.  In an IaaS service offering, the customer is provided 
storage and processing capabilities (Sadiku et al., 2014).  In a SaaS model, the cloud 
provider provides all of the security components (Bejtlich, Steven, & Peterson, 2011; 
Cadregari & Cutaia, 2011; Dai Zovi, 2011; Grobauer, Walloschek, & Stocker, 2011; 
Johnson & Pfleeger, 2011; Lesk, 2012; Nguyen, 2011; Ryan, 2011; Stevens, 2011; Weis 
& Alves-Foss, 2011).   
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Kothari (2013) explained that cloud technologies may provide companies with a 
faster method to deploy applications but include risks that should be considered.  Kothari 
highlighted that the primary cloud security risk is protecting regulated data, specifically, 
data held by banks and insurance companies.  Some examples of security risks related to 
cloud technology are data protection, data disposal, physical controls, access controls, 
logical controls, and reporting obligations (Cadregari & Cutaia, 2011).  Ginovsky (2013) 
urged banks to consider several risks when contemplating the use of outsourced cloud 
technologies.  These risks include vendor health, data segregation, data security, data 
backup, cloud providers’ contractual obligations, eDiscovery, and an exit plan (Ginovsky, 
2013).  Therefore, as financial services institutions utilize new IT, such as cloud 
technologies, consideration should be given to security, data breach, and regulatory risks 
(Kothari, 2013).   
The FFIEC has updated their information on managed security service providers to 
include guidance on using cloud services, which outlines several additional security and 
risk considerations for financial companies to comply with (FFIEC, 2012b).  The FFIEC 
requires regulated financial institutions to protect data in transit, secure data at rest, 
comply with regulatory requirements, comply with offshore data privacy laws, and avoid 
sharing authentication credentials (FFIEC, 2012b).  Fortune 500 financial services 
companies need to consider new regulatory guidance. 
The public cloud is gaining greater adoption by businesses (Columbus, 2013).  Global 
spending on cloud computing is expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 
17.7% between 2011 and 2016 (Columbus, 2013).  Banks are increasing their 
investments in public cloud services.  In a survey of 115 large banks by 
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PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), 71% of bank executives plan to invest more in cloud 
computing, which is an increase of four times over the previous year (Crosman, 2013).  
As Fortune 500 financial services companies host more data in public clouds, new 
information security challenges arise.  Results from a survey conducted by PwC (2015) 
on the state of information security showed that there was a 38% increase in the security 
incidents detected, while information security budgets grew by 24% in 2015 over 2014. 
 
Problem Statement 
Data security breaches can have a financial impact on U.S. publicly traded companies, 
including Fortune 500 financial services companies (Goel & Shawky, 2009).  Financial 
implications include government fines, expenses related to lawsuits, costs of notification 
to individuals with lost personal information (PI), costs to provide identity theft 
protection, and loss of intellectual property that results in a decreased competitive edge or 
loss of market value (Goel & Shawky, 2009).  Goel and Shawky analyzed U.S. publicly 
traded firms with breaches that were made public between 2004 and 2008 and reported 
that there was a negative effect on the company market value the day of the breach, as 
well as a highly significant negative impact on the company stock price on the day 
following the incident.  On average, U.S. publicly traded companies experienced a 1% 
loss of market value over a period of five days from the announcement of a security data 
breach (Goel & Shawky, 2009).  In addition to the cost of the data breach, there are 
longer term implications.  Afroz, Islam, Santell, Chapin, and Greenstadt (2013) found, in 
a survey of 600 participants, analyzing three data breaches of Apple, Sony, and Facebook, 
that consumers are less likely to purchase products from companies that experience a data 
breach.    
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Security breaches also may have an impact on consumers.  Javelin (2013) identified 
an increase of one million victims of identity fraud incidents in 2013.  One in four breach 
notification recipients become a victim of identity fraud (Javelin, 2013).     
Verizon (2013) has been publishing an annual report on data breaches since 2004.  In 
2012, they analyzed 855 incidents, resulting in 175 million compromised records.  The 
companies in the report represented 36 countries, including the United States, and 
company size spanned from fewer than 10 employees to over 100,000.  The companies 
comprised multiple industries, including financial services, retail, accommodations, food 
service, healthcare, and IT.  According to Verizon, in most of the breaches, there was a 
delay between the data breach and the discovery.  They reported that, in 54% of the data 
breaches, it took from one to 12 months from the time that the system was initially 
compromised to the discovery of the data breach.  Further, third parties discovered most 
of the breaches; for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered 59% 
of the data breaches, and payment card processors, such as PayChex and Fiserv, 
identified fraud in 26% of the breaches (Verizon, 2013).   
The Verizon (2013) study demonstrated that companies may not realize that they 
have had a data breach for many months or even years.  The FBI confirmed that they 
were investigating the reported breaches experienced by Dun and Bradstreet, Kroll 
Background America, and LexisNexis (Finkle, 2013); further, KrebsOnSecurity reported 
that the LexisNexis breach likely occurred five months prior to LexisNexis’s being aware 
of the security breach (Finkle, 2013; Krebs, 2013).   
Financial institutions continue to have data breaches, as evidenced by the number of 
reported breaches (Verizon, 2013).  In March 2013, TD Bank lost two unencrypted 
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backup tapes that contained customer data (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015).  In 
April 2013, Prudential Insurance sent an email that contained customers’ data to the 
wrong recipient (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015).  In November 2012, Nationwide 
lost one million customer records due to a cyber attack (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 
2015).  In September 2012, Lincoln Financial lost 4,657 customer records, also due to a 
cyber attack (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015).  In 2014, hackers were able to gain 
access to PI from 76 million J. P. Morgan Chase account holders (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2015).   
These examples demonstrate weaknesses that may exist  from security incidents and 
breaches caused by people, processes, and technology.  Heikkila (2009) examined 
whether the existence of a security policy had a relationship to the number of security 
breaches a company experienced.  In her research, Heikkila hypothesized that IT, 
specifically, virus detection, increased the ability to detect a security incident or breach.  
As IT security tools have expanded beyond merely virus detection technology in relation 
to the implications to incidents and breaches, this research analyzed which IT increase or 
decrease security incidents and breaches, and whether the enterprise believes that the 
technology strengthened or weakened their overall enterprise security.  The problem 
investigated in this case study was whether new IT utilized by Fortune 500 financial 
services companies led to the changes in data security incidents and breaches. This 
dissertation also explored how threat information sharing increases awareness and 
decreases information security incidents and breaches. 
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Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this dissertation is to gain a deeper understanding on how information 
technology can increase awareness of a security incident or breach, and can also decrease 
security incidents and breaches. This dissertation also explores how threat information 
sharing increases awareness and decreases information security incidents and breaches. 
Heikkila (2009) identified the need for further research to understand whether greater 
levels of IT sophistication can increase an institution’s ability to detect a data security 
breach.  The intent of this investigation was to determine the role of IT with respect to 
increasing or decreasing data security breaches.  Incidents could increase or decrease as a 
result of better detection, improved prevention, remediating risks, improved threat 
intelligence, or changing IT compute models.  More specifically, the concern was 
whether different types of IT lead to  an increase or decrease awareness in the number of 
security incidents and breaches that have occurred.   
This case study examined Fortune 500 financial services companies, and what type of 
IT increases or decreases security data breaches or incidents.  The Financial Services 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) is a leading cyber threat intelligence 
institution for financial services.  FS-ISAC members span banks, credit unions, insurance 
companies, and credit card companies.  Financial services within this investigation 
included companies that fall under the scope of FS-ISAC membership.  Increases in 
detecting security incidents and breaches include the company’s awareness of an incident 
of which, prior to the implementation of the IT solution, the company could have been 
unaware.   
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Specifically, several categories of IT were explored in relation to security incidents.  
The categories included IT that (a) provides enhanced security protections, such as data 
loss prevention (DLP), Internet content filtering, and limiting administrative rights; (b) 
provides enhanced security correlation and data analysis, for example, log consolidation, 
log monitoring, and SIEM; (c) enhances business capabilities, such as cloud and mobile 
computing; and (d) threat intelligence services, for example, FS-ISAC or InfraGard 
Members Alliance (InfraGard, 2015).    
The number of security incidents and breaches may increase or decrease for many 
reasons.  Reasons that security incidents may increase include (a) the sophistication of the 
hackers improves (Strohm, 2013); (b) companies improve their information security 
detection and are able to find compromised systems of which they previously would have 
been unaware (EMC
2
, 2013); and (c) companies are using new productivity tools, such as 
mobility and cloud services, that provide a more complex environment and more attack 
points for hackers (Seltzer, 2012).  The sophistication of hackers may be the result of the 
underground economy’s enabling hackers to buy hacking tools or compromised servers.  
Gonsalves (2013) reported that a 1,000-computer botnet, i.e., a type of malware that a 
hacker uses to control an infected computer, is currently priced at $120.  Reasons that 
security incidents may decrease include: (a) companies are using new security technology 
that prevents the compromise of systems (Ohlhorst, 2013); and (b) companies share 
security threat information through organizations such as FS-ISAC (2013a), utilizing 
security intelligence data to block attacks.  The U.S. government provides free 
information on information security threats through the Cyber Emergency Response 
Team (CERT).  The U.S. CERT (2014) website provides information on current security 
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issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits.  Changing threats, IT, and security intelligence can 
affect data security incidents and breaches.   
 
Research Questions 
The following research questions were addressed: 
RQ 1: What type of information security products result in an increased detection of 
security incidents and breaches?    
 RQ 2: What types of security information technology result in a decrease of security 
incidents and breaches?    
RQ 3: How have new technologies, for example, cloud and mobile technologies, 
resulted in an increase or decrease in data security incidents and breaches, and has the 
technology strengthened or weakened enterprise security?    
RQ 4: To what extent can participation in threat-information sharing groups, or threat 
intelligence information sharing, increase awareness of security incidents and breaches?    
 
Relevance and Significance 
Over the past decade, there have been increased government guidance and regulations 
for financial services institutions to report breaches (Romeo & Parrino, 2012; U.S. SEC, 
2011).  Importantly, new regulations related to the Presidential Executive Order on 
Cybersecurity (White House, 2013) have been released (NIST, 2014b).  The NIST cyber 
guideline was created to help organizations that are part of the U.S. critical infrastructure 
to better protect information from a cyber attack (NIST, 2014a).  As of 2015, the NIST 
cybersecurity framework is voluntary for noncritical infrastructure and mandatory for 
government defined critical infrastructure. The goal of the NIST cybersecurity 
14 
 
 
framework is to provide best practices for improving security and resiliency of U.S. 
companies (NIST, 2014a).  The guideline is broken into five areas: identify, protect, 
detect, respond, and recover (NIST, 2014b).   
Current legislation, such as HIPAA and GLBA, require reporting of data breaches.  
As a consequence, financial services companies that hold Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) are subject to data breach regulations and are motivated to decrease 
data breaches (van Kessel & Allan, 2013).  Moreover, corporate boards of directors also 
are concerned about the impact of a security breach on the company (Reeves & Stark, 
2011; Savitz, 2011).   
Data breaches occur not only from external forces; some are perpetrated by end users 
(Verizon, 2013).  Two examples of user errors cited by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
(2015) are; (a) an employee of Mass Mutual who sent an unencrypted email that 
contained the name and social security number of a customer to a third party by mistake 
in 2013; and (b) an employee at Citibank who, in 2013, misconfigured a website, 
allowing people to see other users’ account information.  In some cases, technology can 
help to reduce or prevent human error.   
Miyamoto (2013) identified people as the weakest link in information security.  
People can misjudge a situation that leads to malware infections or data leakage, for 
example, clicking on a malicious attachment in an email (Miyamoto, 2013).  Lack of 
security training, organizational culture, not understanding the risk,  being more 
motivated to get the work accomplished than complying with security controls, and 
making an unintentional error are some of the reasons that end users cause security issues 
(Miyamoto, 2013).   
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Many security products exist to address the challenge of human error, two of which 
are Internet content filtering and DLP.  An example of a product that provides Internet 
content filtering is Cisco’s (2014b) Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Content and 
Security Control.  This provides an anti-virus solution to scan any files downloaded, 
eliminate spam to reduce the chance of people’s responding to phishing attempts, and 
allow organizations to limit what sites employees visit, including sites that are malicious 
or compromised (Cisco, 2014b).   
CA Technologies (2015) provides data protection solutions, which allow an 
organization to set up rules to look for data strings or document tags and prevent data 
from leaving the company.  For example, if a company does not want social security 
numbers to be emailed out of the company, data protection allows a company to block 
any emails that contain social security numbers (CA Technologies, 2015).     
In 40% of the incidents that Verizon (2013) investigated, the attacker took a day or 
more to exfiltrate data from a victim’s IT systems.  Of note is that, in 54% of the data 
breaches, it took between one and 12 months from the time that the system was initially 
compromised to the discovery of the data breach (Verizon, 2013).  Companies may be 
unaware that they have been compromised and that a data breach has occurred (Verizon, 
2013).   
The Target data breach gained government attention.  In a Senate majority staff report 
led by Chairman Jay Rockefeller on March 26, 2014 (U.S. Senate, 2014), the details of 
the Target data breach are outlined, including that the financial and personal records of 
110 million Target customers were compromised and that the records were routed to a 
Russian server.  The attack started through a third-party HVAC provider compromised 
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machine that had access to Target’s network.  Target had multiple layers of security that 
noticed the malware and provided alerts, but the alert was not raised to a sufficient level 
to take action. .  Specifically, the FireEye malware intrusion detection system and 
Symantec software both recognized and alerted on the malware intrusion.  However, the 
hackers were able to take control and loaded malicious code onto the point-of-sales 
systems, which provided the avenue to syphon off customer data.   
The malware was installed between November 15, 2013, and November 30, 2013.  
Target became aware of the breach on December 12, 2013, when the Department of 
Justice contacted Target (U.S. Senate, 2014).  The Senate majority staff report indicated 
that additional IT might have prevented the breach.  Specifically, Target did not have 
Internet content filtering capabilities or a whitelisting process for file transfer protocol 
data transfers, which would limit the destinations of communication flow.  In the timeline 
outlined in the report, it was a month from the first breach of the Target system to when  
the Department of Justice contacted Target.         
It may take a large company (companies with over 1,000 employees) months or even 
years to detect a data breach (Goel & Shawky, 2009; Verizon, 2013).  Companies with 
the ability to quickly detect a security incident or breach create an opportunity to reduce 
the amount of data loss from a compromised system (Verizon, 2013).  The ability to 
catch the attacker in the process of compromising a system may even stop a data breach 
(Verizon, 2013).   
In addition, reducing the window between the initial compromise and discovery could 
avert a data breach (Chickowski, 2013).  In the example of the Target breach, Target 
missed multiple opportunities to respond to security alerts from the FireEye and 
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Symantec security products (Chickowski, 2013).  The longer it takes to respond to an 
attacker, the more firmly rooted the attacker can become within the IT infrastructure 
(Chickowski, 2013).  If a company is able to detect a system compromise by an insider or 
hacker in one day, the negative long-term effects may be more limited than they would be 
if the same system compromise took a year to be detected (Verizon, 2013).   
A class of solutions that could help identify security threats are endpoint security 
products that provide monitoring of endpoints and create alerts of suspicious activity.  An 
example is McAfee Complete Endpoint Protection—Enterprise (McAfee, 2014a).  
Utilizing McAfee’s ePolicy Orchestrator console, an administrator could be alerted to 
suspect activity or policy non-compliance.  To reduce the chance of endpoint infections, a 
company could install products that detect malicious code that comes in from the Internet.  
Additionally, FireEye (2013b) provides products that have the ability to detect whether 
files that enter a system are malware and block the file or alert the administrator.  With 
both of these products, additional alerting provides a company the chance of discovering 
and responding to malicious activity.   
Roos (2013) found in a study of 248 security professionals that, even with the 
benefits of reducing the amount of time to detect a hacker who has gained access to a 
company’s IT systems, only 24% of the respondents used automated technologies, such 
as monitoring for privilege escalation, suspicious data access, and file access changes, to 
detect a security data breach.  In addition, an increase in data security incidents and 
breaches may not be due to carelessness or inadequate security.  Rather, it may be an 
indication of increased security sophistication to detect the event (Chickowski, 2013).  
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Roos explained that, in 36% of large enterprises, automation exists to detect access 
control changes, compared to 28% in companies overall.   
There are multiple products on the market that allow companies to monitor data file 
activities (Imperva, 2015, Tripwire, 2015; Varonis, 2013).  Products like Varonis provide 
the capability to monitor access to sensitive files.  Varonis DatAdvantage for Windows 
contains technology that allows an organization to identify sensitive data, monitor who 
has access to the data, and be alerted when data are accessed.  The product allows an 
administrator to receive alerts for anomalous behaviors and privileged access escalation 
(Varonis, 2013).   
Even with sophisticated IT security  however, companies can fail to react to alerts 
(Vijayan, 2014a).  Vijayan identified scenarios where technology may not be adequate to 
stop malware.  For instance, companies may install a security product but lack a subject 
matter expert, or an organization may install a technology with product defaults, creating 
too many alerts to review and follow up on.  If there are too many false positive alerts, a 
staff can get overwhelmed and miss a real attack (Vijayan, 2014a).  In the case of the 
Target breach, Vijayan pointed out that security alerts occurred, but the Target security 
staff did not take appropriate action.   
This dissertation research expands on knowledge that pertains to how information 
security technologies increase or decrease the number of security incidents and breaches 
detected and whether having access to threat intelligence drives greater awareness, 
leading to more or fewer security incidents.  An increase in security incidents could be 
the result of better detection, improving the overall enterprise security of the company.   
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The focus of the research was a subset of financial services Fortune 500 companies.  
Financial services are a top target for hackers due to the financial gain that can be 
achieved from a data breach (InformationWeek, 2012).  IT industry papers and articles 
describe technology gaps that could detect or prevent data security breaches (Chickowski, 
2013; IBM, 2013; van Kessel & Allan, 2013; Verizon, 2013).  This research focused on 
providing information pertaining to the utilization of IT security and whether the new IT 
security technology increased or decreased data security incidents and breaches in 
Fortune 500 financial services companies.  The results provided details on how Fortune 
500 financial services companies are applying IT security technology, and the results 
they are experiencing. .   
 
Barriers and Issues 
Companies are reluctant to respond to surveys on information and security breaches.  
This reluctance is demonstrated by the typically low response rate to security research 
surveys, unless there is an established relationship with the survey organizations.  For 
example, Heikkila (2009) distributed a Web-based survey to 1,123 Information Legal 
Technology Association members and received 88 valid responses, a 7.83% valid 
response rate.  Doherty and Fulford (2005) surveyed 2838 people with a 7.7% valid 
response rate.  Wiant (2005) surveyed 2500 people with a 5.6% response rate.  Finding 
willing participants are an integral part of information security research.   
 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
 
Ellis and Levy (2009) define an assumption to be what researchers take for granted.  
Assumptions of the this study included: (a) participants would be honest and not hold 
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back data when responding to interview questions; (b) participants held broad enough 
knowledge as leaders of their company to answer interview questions accurately; and (c) 
the author was not biased and would not perform incorrect pattern matching with the 
available data.   
Delimitation refers to the factors, constructs, and/or variables intentionally left out of 
the study (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  Delimitations can affect external validity or 
generalizability (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  Delimitations of this study were (a) the study was 
focused only on Fortune 500 financial services companies, and generalization outside of 
this sector was limited; and (b) the sample size of nine security professionals in the 
Fortune 500 financial services sector may have affected generalizability.   
 
Definition of Terms 
  
Advanced Persistent Threat: A deliberately slow-moving cyber attack that is applied 
quietly to compromise information systems (Friedberg & Skopik, 2015). 
Bot: A term short for robot.  Criminals distribute malicious software that can turn a 
computer into a bot.  When this occurs, a computer can perform automated tasks over the 
Internet without one’s awareness (Microsoft, 2014a).   
Botnet: Criminals use bots to infect large numbers of computers.  These computers 
form a network, or a botnet.  Criminals use botnets to send out spam email messages, 
spread viruses, attack computers and servers, and commit other kinds of fraud (Microsoft, 
2014a).   
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD): Mobile devices that are personally owned, not a 
corporate asset (NIST, 2013d). 
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Brute Force Password Attack: A method of accessing an obstructive device through 
attempting multiple combinations of numeric and/or alphanumeric passwords (NIST, 
2013e).   
Buffer Overflow: A condition where more input is placed into a buffer than the 
capacity allows, overwriting other information.  Attackers exploit such a condition to 
crash a system or insert malicious code to gain access to the system (NIST, 2013e).   
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A federal agency tasked with 
ensuring that consumers get the information they need to make financial decisions based 
on clear, up-front pricing and risk visibility.  The CFPB regulates unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive practices by financial institutions (CFPB, 2015). 
Containerization: An isolated space on a mobile device that allows for separation, 
data protection for the company device, and privacy for personal data of the user (NIST, 
2013d).   
Crimeware: Tools that drive hackers’ attacks and fuel the black market (e.g., bots, 
Trojan horses, spyware; Norton, 2014) 
Cryptocurrency: A digital medium of exchange that uses encryption to secure the 
process involved in generating units and conducting transactions (WhatIs, 2016). 
Cyber Attack: An attack, via cyberspace, that targets an enterprise’s use of cyberspace 
for the purpose of disrupting, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computer 
environment/infrastructure; destroying the integrity of the data; or stealing controlled 
information (NIST, 2013e).   
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Data Breach: An organization’s unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, 
or loss of sensitive PI, such as social security numbers; financial information, such as 
credit card numbers; date of birth; or mother’s maiden name (NIST, 2010). 
Data Security Breach: An organization’s unauthorized or unintentional exposure, 
disclosure, or loss of sensitive PI, which can include PII, such as social security numbers; 
or financial information, such as credit card numbers (National Conference of State 
Legislators, 2013). 
Data Security Incident: A violation or imminent threat of violation of a computer 
security policy, acceptable use policy, or standard security practice (NIST, 2012a);  or an 
accessed occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of an information system or the information that the system processes, 
stores, or transmits (NIST, 2013e). 
Data Loss Prevention (DLP): Products that safeguard intellectual property and ensure 
compliance by protecting sensitive data through policy rules and tagging documents to 
control the flow of data (Cisco 2014c; McAfee 2014b). 
De-identification: A technique to find and remove sensitive information by replacing 
or encrypting the sensitive data (Rahmani, Amine, & Hamou, 2015).   
Denial of Service (DoS): The prevention of authorized access to resources or the 
delaying of time-critical operations (NIST, 2013e). 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).  An approach whereby the hacker attempts to 
make a service unavailable to its intended users by draining system or networking 
resources, using multiple attacking systems (Wang, Zheng, Wenjing, & Hou, 2014).   
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC): Independent government agency 
that preserves and promotes public confidence in the U.S. financial system by insuring 
deposits in banks for at least $250,000 and monitoring financial risks of banks (FDIC, 
2015).   
Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (FFIEC): Interagency body 
established in 1979 to provide uniform principles, standards, and reporting forms for 
federal examinations targeted at financial institutions (FFIEC, 2015a).   
Federal Trade Commission (FTC): Independent government agency whose mission is 
to prevent business practices that are anti-competitive, deceptive, or unfair to consumers 
(FTC, 2015).   
Federal Reserve System (FRS): The United States central bank.  They set national 
monitory policy, supervise and regulate banks and other financial systems, and provide 
oversight to the U.S. payment system (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2014). 
Hacker: Unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an information system 
(NIST, 2013e). 
Hypervisor: Software, firmware, or hardware that controls the flow of instructions 
between the guest operating system and the physical hardware (NIST, 2011). 
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): Pieces of forensic data, such as data found in 
system log entries or files, that identify potentially malicious activity on a system or 
network (TechTarget, 2015). 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC): Organizations segmented by 
industry segment, for example, communications, energy, emergency management, 
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financial services, healthcare, transportation, IT, maritime, nuclear, public transit, 
research and education, supply chain, and water.  The purpose of an ISAC is to share 
security threat information within the industry sector and with the government; its goal to 
improve the security of the companies that participate in the ISAC (National Council of 
ISACs, 2013). 
Intrusion Detection System: Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes 
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible 
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse (NIST, 2013e). 
Intrusion Prevention System: Systems that can detect and attempt to stop an intrusive 
activity, ideally before it reaches its target (NIST, 2013e). 
Jailbreak: When a device is altered allowing the operating system to bypass security 
controls (Constantin, 2014).  
Key Logger: A program designed to record which keys are pressed on a computer 
keyboard; used to obtain passwords or encryption keys for bypassing other security 
measures (NIST, 2013e). 
Malicious Code: Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process 
that will have an adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an 
information system (NIST, 2013e). 
Malware: Code targeted to infect a user’s device.  When successful, the hacker is able 
to control the user’s device, which may lead to data loss or escalation in the hacker’s 
privileges on the information system (Beuhring & Salous, 2014). 
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Mobile Application Management (MAM): Solutions that allow IT administrators to 
remotely install, update, remove, audit, and monitor enterprise applications on mobile 
devices (Eslahi, Var Naseri, Hashim, Tahir, & Saad, 2014). 
Mobile Device: Smart phones, tablets, portable cartridge/disk-based, removable 
storage media (e.g., floppy disks, compact disks, USB flash drives, external hard drives, 
flash memory cards/drives that contain nonvolatile memory; NIST, 2013d, 2013e). 
Mobile Device Management (MDM): System to remotely monitor the status of 
mobile devices to enforce security policies (Eslahi et al., 2014). 
National Credit Union Administration: (NCUA).  An independent federal agency that 
regulates, charters, and supervises federal credit unions.  The NCUA insures millions of 
individual credit union account holders (NCUA, 2015). 
Network Sniffing: A passive technique that monitors network communication, 
decodes protocols, and examines headers and payloads for information of interest.  It is 
both a review technique and a target identification and analysis technique (NIST, 2013e).   
Non-public Information: Information that is not publicly available that a consumer 
provides to a financial institution to obtain a product or service, for example, an account 
balance (OCC, 2011). 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC): Independent bureau in the U.S. 
Treasury that ensures that national banks and federal savings associations operate in a 
safe and sound manner, providing fair access to financial services, and comply with 
applicable laws and regulations (OCC, 2015). 
Packet Sniffer: Software that observes and records network traffic (NIST, 2013e). 
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Protected Health Information (PHI): Individual identifiable health information 
transmitted or maintained in any form by a covered entity or business associate.  PHI 
includes medical records, test results, and treatments.  A covered entity includes 
healthcare providers, health plan providers, and healthcare clearing houses.  A business 
associate is another company that processes data on behalf of the covered entity.  ePHI is 
electronic protected health information (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
[HHS]; 2013b).   
Personal Information: Information from individuals that can uniquely identify a 
specific person (NISTIR 8053, 2015). 
Personal Identifiable Information (PII): Information that can be used to distinguish or 
trace an individual’s identity, such as his or her name, social security number, or 
biometric records, alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying 
information that is linked to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth or 
mother’s maiden name (NIST, 2013e).   
Phishing: A digital form of social engineering that uses authentic-looking, but bogus, 
emails to request information from users, directs the user to a fake web site that requests 
information, or entices a user to open a malicious attachment (NIST, 2013e).   
Privileged account: An information system account with approved authorizations of a 
privileged user (NIST, 2013e). 
Privileged user: A user that is authorized to perform security relevant functions on a 
computer server that ordinary users are not authorized to perform (NIST, 2013e).  
27 
 
 
Ransomware: A type of malware that encrypts files and prevents the user from 
accessing data until the user pays a certain amount of money (ransom) to decrypt the files 
(Beuhring & Salous, 2014; Microsoft, 2014b).   
Rootkit: A set of tools used by an attacker after gaining root-level access to a host to 
conceal the attacker’s activities on the host and permit the attacker to maintain the access 
through covert means (NIST, 2013e).   
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC): A federal agency whose mission is to 
protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital 
formation (U.S. SEC, 2013). 
Security Event: Any observable security occurrence in a system network (NIST, 
2012a).   
Security Incident: A violation or imminent threat of violation of a computer security 
policy, acceptable use policy, or standard security practice (NIST, 2012a).  These include 
an accessed occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an information system or the information that the system 
processes, stores, or transmits (NIST, 2013e). 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Tool: Application that provides 
the ability to gather security data from information system components and present that 
data as actionable information via a single interface (NIST, 2013e).   
Smartphone: Mobile phones with the ability to provide applications and multimedia 
communications (Longfei, Xiaojiang, & Xinwen, 2014). 
SPAM: The abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately send 
unsolicited bulk messages (Homeland Security, 2016).  
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Spyware: Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed on an information 
system to gather information on individuals or organizations without their knowledge 
(NIST, 2013e).   
Trojan Horse: A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also 
has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, 
sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the 
program (NIST, 2013e).   
Unauthorized User: A user who accesses a resource that he or she is not authorized to 
use (NIST, 2013e).   
Virtualization: Hiding the discrepancy between the virtual and physical allocation of 
information technology resources (Jin, Seol, Huh, & Maeng, 2015). 
Virtual Machine: A separate logical instance of resources for a user or application 
that in reality is shared physical hardware (Jin et al., 2015).   
Worm: A self-replicating, self-propagating, self-contained program that uses 
networking mechanisms to spread malicious code (NIST, 2013e).   
A complete list of acronyms is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter presents the research problem, specifically, how the use of IT affects the 
ability to protect or detect a security data incident or breach.  The goal of this research 
was to provide more insight into how IT relates to the changes in security incidents and 
breaches.  Prior research considered security policy (Doherty & Fulford, 2005; Heikkila, 
2009; Wiant, 2005).  Heikkila suggested further research to understand how the use of IT 
may affect data security breaches.   
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Chapter 2   
 
Review of the Literature 
 
This section presents the literature relevant to the security policies and regulations 
that are currently in effect with regard to the financial services industry, as well as 
industry data on security threats and breaches, business enablement IT, security products, 
and security threat-information sharing forums.  The section concludes with literature on 
security best practices.  The financial services sector includes insurance companies, 
which consists of institutions that could process and hold healthcare information for 
employees and customers; therefore, healthcare regulations are included.  FS-ISAC 
(2013b) membership is open to financial institutions, insurance companies, and publicly 
held securities/brokerage firms.  This research explored how IT and threat-intelligence 
sharing increase or decrease the identification of data security incidents and breaches.   
 
 
Financial Services Security Regulations 
Financial services are a highly regulated industry sector.  Within the United States, 
the SEC and FTC have broad oversight over publicly traded financial services companies.  
This section presents the regulations as of 2015 that the financial services sector are 
required to meet and how government bodies are used to drive information security 
requirements for the financial services sector.    
The FFIEC (2012a), established in 1979, is a U.S. government interagency regulatory 
body that consists of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of 
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the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Comsumer Financial Protection Bireau 
(CFPB).  The purpose of the FFIEC and its associated group of regulators is to provide 
federal supervision to financial institutions, including banks, bank holding companies, 
savings and loans, and credit unions (FFIEC, 2015a).   
The FFIEC provides specific guidance regarding information security through the IT 
Examination Handbook (FFIEC, 2006), which states that regulated financial services 
sector companies should monitor networks and servers to detect activity for policy 
violations and anomalous behavior.  If incidents are discovered, the FFIEC suggests that 
the regulated entity: (a) report the security incident to the appropriate groups, which 
could include law enforcement; (b) submit a suspicious activities report when critical 
information is stolen or critical systems are damaged; and (c) inform the industry ISAC 
of the details of the incident, as well as to inform other ISAC members to look for any 
common indicators of attack, such as an attacking IP address or a malware signature 
(FFIEC, 2006).  In June 2013, the FFIEC started a working group to promote 
coordination between federal and state regulators to enhance communication among 
FFIEC member agencies regarding cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure 
(FFIEC, 2013).  Financial services companies have multiple regulations around 
information security and data breach notification.   
 
 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
The U.S. government Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) was enacted to protect patient health data.  HIPAA required doctors’ offices 
and nursing companies to have an information security policy in place by April 20, 2005 
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(U.S. Department of HHS, 2013b).  HIPAA also required healthcare providers, providers 
of health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses to implement access controls, audit 
controls, integrity controls, and transmission security on their IT systems (U.S. 
Department of HHS, 2013b).  The HIPAA regulations not only drove changes in security 
policy but also required companies to consider IT security investments to meet the 
regulatory requirements.   
      The HIPAA security regulations affect not only doctors’ offices and nursing homes, 
but also health insurance companies, companies that house data on institutions’ health 
plans, and government programs that store health data.  In addition, as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), HIPAA requirements were 
expanded to include having companies report, within 60 days of the discovery of the 
breach, any losses of unsecured PHI that affect individuals (Holloway & Fensholt, 2009).  
This expanded scope includes institutions that provide financial and administrative 
transactions (Holloway & Fensholt, 2009; U.S. Department of HHS, 2013a).  Importantly, 
insurance companies are part of the financial services sector and may hold HIPAA-
regulated data of customers or employees.  ARRA, also known as the stimulus package, 
is a 407-page bill that provides government actions to improve the economy.  The latest 
changes to HIPAA were driven through the ARRA bill (Track the Money, 2013). 
 
 
Industry Data on Security Threats and Breaches 
 
Security threats are the result of a malicious or criminal attack, a system glitch, or 
human factor (Ponemon Institute, 2014).  The Ponemon Institute identified factors that 
can influence the cost of a data breach, including data that was lost by a third party or a 
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breach that involved stolen devices.  The cost of a data breach can be reduced by a 
company’s having a relatively strong security posture at the time of the incident, having 
an incident management plan, and having a chief information security officer (CISO) 
who has responsibility for enterprise data protection.  Chapman, Leblanc, and Partington 
(2011) provided a base set of terminology of cyber attacks to better understand the threats 
from external hackers that could lead to data security incidents and breaches.  For 
instance, a DoS attack overwhelms a computer’s resources, making the computer system 
unable to respond to legitimate requests.  Additionally, stack-based buffer overflow 
occurs when a poorly written application allows for insertion of code into a field that is 
executed, which allows a hacker to take unauthorized control (Chapman et al., 2011).   
Other security threats include (a) phishing, which occurs when a user is sent an email 
with the intended purpose of coercing the user to reveal PI, open an attachment, or click 
on a link that leads to malware being loaded onto the user’s system (NIST, 2013e); (b) 
password hacking, the act of a hacker discovering a user’s password by guessing or using 
a tool to automate the attack on the password (Chapman et al., 2011); and (c) packet 
sniffing, which involves collecting information that flows over a network, which could 
include sensitive information or passwords (Chapman et al., 2011). 
Once a hacker gains access to a system, using a particular user’s information, he or 
she can utilize the privileges of the user.  If the user has root access or administrative 
privileges, the hacker can gain greater control of the system (Chapman et al., 2011).  
With the elevated privileges, for example, administration rights or root level authority to 
a workstation or a server, a hacker can create a backdoor that allows him or her to gain 
access to the system, even if the hacker loses control of the user’s machine.  A hacker can 
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install a rootkit on a compromised system, giving the hacker control of the system 
(Chapman et al., 2011).  When spyware or key loggers are installed on a user’s system, 
the hacker can record the actions of the user and receive information that the user is 
generating (Chapman et al., 2011).   
A Trojan horse is another form of malicious code that is disguised in information of 
potential interest to a user (Chapman et al., 2011).  For example, a user could download 
an application that provides driving directions, but, in addition to the driving directions, 
the code is placing malware onto the user’s system (Chapman et al., 2011).  When the 
corrupt function is installed and executed, the malware works to infect other systems.  
Worms are similar to viruses but do not need user involvement to spread (Chapman et al., 
2011).   
Mobile devices also contribute to IT being susceptible to data loss (Leavitt, 2013).  
According to Leavitt, there are several potential threats to mobile devices, including 
unprotected data when a device is lost and data leakage to a public cloud or other 
destination.  There has been explosive growth in smartphone sales, with smartphone 
shipments tripling in the last three years (Zhou & Jiang, 2012).  However, the expansion 
of operating systems and device types creates new security threats and increases 
complexity for IT security professionals when applying security controls (Johnson & 
Pfleeger, 2011; Miller, 2011).   
For instance, mobile device malware is generating a growing level of possible 
compromise as mobile devices host additional software and store increasing amounts of 
data (Felt, Finifter, Chin, Hanna, & Wagner, 2011).  Based on the evaluation of four 
different products that detect malware, Zhou and Jiang (2012) found that, on more than 
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1,200 mobile devices over 14 months between 2010 and 2011, the malware detection 
software products detected a maximum of 79.6% of mobile malware that existed; in the 
worst case, they detected only 20.2%.  In addition, malware attacks can have different 
“personalities.”  Some malware is slow and quiet, with the goal of being undetected.  
Malware also may be fast and aggressive, intending to disrupt business (Dittrich, Bailey, 
& Dietrich, 2011).  To add security protections to mobile devices, Leavitt (2013) 
suggested the installation of MDM, which provides an ability to set security policies for 
mobile devices and manage and monitor the security of a mobile device, and MAM, 
which secures a mobile application and controls application access to corporate networks 
and data.     
The threat landscape changes as hackers advance their tactics, such as using botnets 
and DDoS servers to execute their attacks.  Ablon, Libicki, and Golay (2014), in a report 
that focused on the marketplace for cybercrime tools and stolen data, were able to put 
prices on what hackers would pay for cybercrime tools.  For instance, a hacker can buy a 
malware exploit kit for a couple thousand dollars (Ablon et al., 2014).  Cyber hacking 
tools lower the level of knowledge the attacker needs to launch a cyber attack.  In 
addition, the hacking community has moved to digital cryptocurrencies that offer 
anonymity.  Examples of crypto currencies are Liberty Reserve, WebMoney, and 
Bitcoins (Ablon et al., 2014).   
The propagation of malware is part of the changing threat landscape, and malicious 
code is at the root of much criminal activity on the Internet (Bayer, Kirda, & Kruegel, 
2010).  Bayer et al. estimated that, in 2010, there were 35,000 new malicious pieces of 
code daily.  In 2013, the average number of malware rose to 82,000 per day (Bradley, 
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2014).  Bayer et al. studied automated dynamic malware analysis systems, which will run 
suspect malicious code in a separate environment and assess whether the code is 
malicious by monitoring the actions of the code.   
Browser isolation technology is a technology that prevents browser-based malware 
from infecting an institution’s network.  vSentry and LAVA are two products by 
Bromium (2015) that provide protection against malware.  Bromium uses Intel’s central 
processing unit (CPU) feature to create a virtual environment in a hardware isolated 
container, which provides malware protection to the user when inadvertently visiting a 
malicious Internet site or opening an untrusted document.  vSentry automatically discards 
malware after the user completes his or her task, and LAVA provides attack visualization, 
giving the security analyst insight into what the malware was attempting to accomplish 
(Bromium, 2015).   
Kancherla and Mukkamala (2013) created image visualization techniques to identify 
malware and obtained 95% accuracy on a dataset that contained 25,000 malware and 
12,000 benign samples.  The identification of malware provides companies an 
opportunity to eliminate the malware from information systems.   
Technology companies also provided insights about malware attacks from breaches 
that they have investigated.  Check Point (2013) analyzed security threats and provided a 
public report, available on the Internet, about their analysis.  Specifically, the analysis 
was conducted on 356 companies worldwide, 40% of which were from the Americas; the 
finance industry represented 14% of the study participants.  Check Point gathered the 
information over three months in 2012, utilizing network cloud monitoring data from a 
service that they provide.  The Check Point report noted the change in hacker landscape 
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from lone individuals to well-funded structured organizations. In 63% of the 
organizations that Check Point studied, the organizations  were infected with bots.  
As previously noted, criminals use bots to infect large numbers of computers.  These 
computers form a network, or a botnet.  Criminals use botnets to send out spam email 
messages, spread viruses, attack computers and servers, and commit other kinds of fraud 
(Microsoft, 2014a; Yu, Gu, Barnawi, Guo, & Stojmenovic, 2015).  Botnets are sold 
online for under $100 each (Check Point, 2013), and they can spread viruses, distribute 
malicious software, steal data, attack computers, and send out spam, without the user’s 
knowledge.  Check Point’s research showed that 63% of the organizations they studied 
were infected with botnets.  However, if an organization does not know that they are 
infected with malware, they cannot mobilize their information security team to address 
the infection.     
Check Point (2013) reported that, in 2012, there were 5,672 product vulnerabilities 
identified by vendors.  The top three vendors with product vulnerabilities were Oracle, 
Apple, and Microsoft.  The challenge of financial services companies is to patch all of 
these products in a timely manner to remediate the vulnerability for their company and 
not disrupt financial applications.  Check Point’s research showed that 75% of the 
companies in their study were not using the latest version of their software.   
Check Point (2013) further noted that the ability to share data easily has added to the 
risk of data loss and reported that 80% of organization use free file-sharing software, 
such as Dropbox, Windows Live Office, YouSendIt, Sugarsync, and PutLocker, which 
allow users to share data outside the corporate network, which further increases the 
chance of data loss.  Romer (2014) suggested that companies block free file-sharing 
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Internet sites to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of company data.  In addition, 
companies are moving to greater utilization of social media sites, such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and LinkedIn (Check Point, 2013).  However, hackers also are using these sites 
to deliver malware to users (Check Point, 2013).  In Check Point’s report, 61% of the 
financial industry companies had at least one potential data loss incident.    
Check Point (2013) identified multiple areas in which technology can assist 
companies in protecting their data and systems.  DLP is a technology that allows an 
organization to monitor outgoing data and to block data that meet defined criteria 
(Tahboub & Saleh, 2014).  Cisco and McAfee both sell DLP solutions (Cisco, 2014c; 
McAfee, 2014b) that are capable of blocking data elements like social security numbers, 
bank account numbers, and healthcare data from being sent in clear text within emails 
(Check Point, 2014c).  DLP solutions search for patterns in data, or a specific tag added 
to a document, and can either monitor and log that the data left the company through 
email or the Internet, or block the data transmission.  Security analysis can monitor the 
data blocked or transmitted that fit the policy that was defined within the DLP product 
(CA Technologies, 2015; Cisco, 2014c; McAfee, 2014b).   
Firewalls have added more granularity and insight into the data that are being 
transmitted (Snyder, 2012).  One example is the Palo Alto (2015) next-generation 
firewall, which provides the ability to understand and block specific applications and 
users from transmitting data.  Next-generation firewalls can identify what applications are 
allowed to utilize specific resources, thereby reducing the chance of malicious rogue 
malware exfiltrating data from a company (Snyder, 2012).  Next-generation firewalls 
could be used by financial services network security teams to stop the flow of specific 
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data from an application or user when the security team suspects that the system or user 
has been compromised (Snyder, 2012).   
However, Snyder (2012) explained that the additional power of the next-generation 
firewalls adds complexity over traditional firewalls, and this complexity could create 
miscoded rules, leading to security incidents and making the environment more difficult 
to manage.  Increased granular controls at the firewall layer could help prevent data 
security incidents and breaches (Snyder, 2012).  Companies can outsource their next-
generation firewalls to a service provider.  One example is Dell SecureWorks, which will 
run and monitor the security of firewalls (Dell, 2014).  New technology innovations 
provide companies additional capabilities for protecting data.       
IBM provides an annual report on security and risk (IBM, 2013).  IBM X-Force is a 
research and development team focused on computer security threats, vulnerabilities, and 
data protection (IBM, 2013).  To conduct the analysis of security threats, IBM utilized 
IBM Managed Security Services data to identify security threats associated with botnets, 
application vulnerabilities, and spam.  IBM Managed Security Services provide a set of 
security services that companies can outsource.  IBM’s set of services includes mobile 
endpoint protection services, firewall management, identity and access management, and 
DDoS monitoring and protection (IBM, 2014b).  To address security threats, IBM 
suggested several investments in technology that they sell, such as identity and access 
management tools, managed security services, and security information and event 
management products, to protect data and ensure that only authorized personnel can 
access data (IBM, 2013).      
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McAfee (2012, 2015) publishes a quarterly report on security threats, which showed 
an increase in incidents of mobile malware and mobile spyware.  In the last quarter of 
2014, McAfee (2015b) identified over 6 million different mobile malware signatures.  
Ransomware is one such instance of malware; it takes control of a system, after which 
hackers require payment to unlock it (Microsoft, 2014b).  In the second quarter of 2015 
McAfee (2015b) identified 1.2 million new ransomware samples, for a total of over 4 
million. This represents a 25% growth in ransomware samples in 2Q 2015 (McAfee, 
2015b).   
Cryptolocker is a specific instance of ransomware, where the attacker encrypts files 
on a user’s device and demands payment for the files to be decrypted (Mustaca, 2014).  
Jeffers (2013) reported that, between September 2013, when Cryptolocker was first 
identified, through December 2013, Cryptolocker grossed $30 million in ransom 
payments.  To assist users who become compromised by Cryptolocker, some technology 
vendors have offered free services to unencrypt systems that have been infected with 
Cryptolocker malware (Seltzer, 2014).   
As more businesses and users move to mobile devices, so will the hackers, as noted 
by the growth in Android malware (McAfee, 2012; Mearian, 2013).  Mearian reported 
that mobile malware, mainly targeting the Android operating system, increased by 614% 
from March 2012 to March 2013.  Androids represented 52% of the mobile device 
market in 2012 (Mearian, 2013).  Zheng, Sun, and Lui (2013) applied security analytics 
to mobile devices.  They implemented DroidAnalytics, a signature-based analytics 
system to collect, manage, analyze, and extract Android malware.  In analyzing 150,368 
Android applications, their solution was able to identify 102 different families of Android 
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malware, with 327 specific zero-day malware instances.  Further, Peng, Wang, and Yu 
(2013) developed a model to study the propagation of malware on mobile devices spread 
through social networks.  Their work provided understanding on how worms would 
spread on mobile devices based on the social networks in which a user participated.  As 
smartphones grow in usage and functionality, they are enticing targets for hackers and 
malware writers (Peng et al., 2013).   
Technology exists to help companies defend against attacks.  FireEye (2013b) is a 
security company that provides technology that allows the user to execute suspect email 
attachments and links within emails in a virtual environment to determine whether they 
are malicious.  According to the Senate analysis of the Target breach (U.S. Senate, 2014), 
the FireEye solution, which provides dynamic malware protections, recognized the attack, 
but the Target staff did not follow through to address the threat information.  In another 
instance, the FireEye (2013a) threat report indicated that FireEye appliances located in a 
financial services sector detected malware events that penetrated the perimeter security 
10 times per hour, demonstrating that the financial services sector is under constant 
malware attack.  FireEye (2013a) determined that, in 92% of the cases, malware is 
delivered as an email zip file attachment.     
Cyberwar and cyber attacks are concerns to industry and governments (Elliott, 2011; 
Fidler, 2011; Parks & Duggan, 2011).  With several cyber attacks being reported in the 
media, such as Stuxnet and DDoS attacks against Estonia and Georgia, cyberwar is no 
longer a hypothetical attack scenario (Elliott, 2011; Fidler, 2011; Parks & Duggan, 2011).  
One issue that makes cyberwar more complicated than a traditional war is the difficulty 
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in identifying the attacker (Elliott, 2011; Fidler, 2011; Parks & Duggan, 2011).  Nation 
state cyber threats are a risk to Fortune 500 financial services companies.    
In the spring of 2013, the media reported DDoS attacks against the U.S. banking 
community, including such financial institutions as American Express, Ameriprise 
Financial, Bank of America, BB&T, Citizens Financial, PNC, and KeyCorp.  The DDoS 
attacks achieved sustained floods of 70 Gbps and 30 million packets per second 
(Schwartz, 2013).  Defending against these security data breaches and external threats is 
an ongoing challenge (Kitten, 2013), and the FFIEC has directed banks to combat DDoS 
attacks by monitoring Internet traffic, having a DDoS response plan, ensuring proper 
staffing to execute the DDoS response, and sharing information about the attack with FS-
ISAC (Messmer, 2014).   
In 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment fell to a targeted malware attack, instigated, 
according to the FBI, by North Korea.  The malware used to attack Sony erased all 
computer hard drives.  The attacker took copies of internal documents and movies and 
released the information to the public (Krebs, 2014).Researchers who work at Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University developed an 
assessment tool that allows a security incident responder to assess the risk of an attack 
and identify a response plan (Connell & Waits, 2013).  The assessment tool is loaded 
with the roles and responsibilities of the team and the critical data on the system.  The 
goal of the tool is to identify the threat and quickly respond before the malicious code has 
time to propagate in the system.   
 
 
 
42 
 
 
Business Enablement IT 
Technology continually advances, giving more options to support changing business 
models.  Two examples of technology advances are cloud computing and mobile device 
usage and capabilities (PwC, 2013).  Cloud providers are focused on security because a 
security breach could ruin their business, and, indeed, there have been only a few cloud 
security breaches to date (Banham, 2014).  Microsoft Business Productivity Online Suite 
had a breach in 2010, where customer data could be accessed by someone other than the 
owner, and, in 2013, GoGrid disclosed that an unauthorized third party may have viewed 
account information (Banham, 2014).   
In yet another example of security breaches, fraudsters are using stolen PI to create 
Apple Pay credentials to buy merchandise at participating merchants (Krebs, 2015).  
Further, mobile banking applications are a vector of security vulnerabilities.  Constantin 
(2014) reported that, in the analysis by IOActive of the mobile applications of 60 
financial institutions, none of the applications detected that the device was jailbroken, i.e., 
had allowed the operating system to bypass security controls (Constantin, 2014).  Further, 
40% of the financial mobile applications analyzed did not validate the authenticity of the 
digital certificate, making the application vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks 
(Constantin, 2014).  IOActive suggested several actions to improve the security of 
financial mobile applications, including the use of secure transfer protocols, encrypting 
sensitive data, and detecting jailbroken devices (Constantin, 2014).  As companies exploit 
new technology, new security threats emerge, and new security technology solutions are 
created.       
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Amoroso (2013), the chief security officer at AT&T, explained how the technology 
evolution set the stage for business process changes, which resulted in an increase of 
information security challenges.  Amoroso explained, as companies started to utilize 
email as a mechanism to communicate to external parties, external email forced 
companies to open network ports and accept traffic from outside the company’s network.  
External email created the security challenges of additional attacks within the company’s 
network, including spam, malware embedded in email, and the risk that an employee 
could send sensitive data through external email, creating data loss and possibly creating 
a privacy breach if the data were in the scope of privacy regulations.   
Amoroso (2013) explained that, to defend against the new security threats, companies 
need to add such technology as anti-spam, anti-virus, anti-malware, DLP, and intrusion 
prevention systems (IPSs) to their computers.  Further, according to Amoroso, there has 
been a growing number of mobile devices and the functions that they can perform.  The 
increase in the use of mobile devices creates a threat to perimeter security by creating 
additional network connections on a corporate network, as well as vectors for outgoing 
data.  Many of the mobile devices have integrated public cloud services to back up 
information, which creates additional data protection challenges for a company.  To 
provide control over corporate assets on mobile devices, technologies such as MDM and 
MAM are being utilized (Leavitt, 2013).    
Amoroso (2013) suggested implementing tiered network architecture to address the 
expanded information security challenges that companies face.  The core network would 
contain firewalls, IPSs, DLPs, anti-virus, anti-spam, anti-malware, SIEM, and access 
management (Amoroso, 2013).  A tiered network design would allow critical business 
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data and programs to be separated from less critical systems and data.  Amoroso advised 
that highly robust security technology and architecture will enable businesses to take 
advantage of cloud and mobile technologies.  An example of failed network segmentation 
is the Target data breach (Vijayan, 2014b).  The Target network design allowed the 
breach to start from a third-party HVAC system, which ultimately gained access to point-
of-sales devices (Vijayan, 2014b).      
Cloud environments have five unique characteristics, including on-demand self-
services, access through the Internet, resource sharing, elasticity, and monitoring (Idrissi, 
Kartit, & Marraki, 2013), to be considered to reduce the chance of data loss (Ballabio, 
2013). Businesses are moving workloads to cloud environments for many positive 
security reasons: (a) cloud environments are large and highly distributed, which provides 
added protection to deflect cyber attacks; (b) cloud infrastructures are highly redundant, 
providing added resiliency in a cyber attack; and (c) load balancing creates sophisticated 
fail over capabilities that could be utilized under a security attack (Ballabio, 2013).      
Grobauer et al. (2011) provided an overview of the information on security threats for 
cloud environments.  As companies consider utilizing cloud technology, they need to 
consider the risks and the benefits of doing so.  Some examples of security risks related 
to cloud technology are data protection, data disposal, physical controls, access controls, 
logical controls, and reporting obligations (Cadregari & Cutaia, 2011).  Grobauer et al. 
defined cloud vulnerabilities to include attacks on the virtual machine, session hijacking, 
and Internet protocol vulnerabilities.  NIST created guidance when using cloud 
environments (NIST 800-146, 2012). NIST highlights several open issues that consumers 
should consider when utilizing public cloud services. Issues that should be considered are 
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that the consumer retains the responsibility for regulatory compliance, the lack of 
visibility within the cloud service, and the challenge of forensic support.   
Alfath, Baina, and Baina (2013) identified unique security risks for cloud 
environments, including (a) multiple tenants’ data coexist, (b) enterprises lose control of 
their data, (c) there is a lack of security guarantees, and (d) public infrastructures make 
clouds more vulnerable to attack.  Eken (2013) highlighted several cloud security threats, 
such as increased complexity, the lack of ability to conduct investigations on who 
accessed data, data comingling between different companies, reliance on the cloud 
provider for data backups, unsecured data transfer between the company and the cloud 
provider, and unsecured data disposal.       
A cloud provider’s environment is complex due to the need to separate and secure 
multiple users’ data (Khalil, Kreishah, Bouktif, & Ahmed, 2013).  One of the technical 
underpinnings of the cloud environment is virtualization of physical resources that 
logically separate workloads and environments (Jin et al., 2015).  Duncan, Creese, 
Goldsmith, and Quinton (2013) provided insights into hypervisor attacks.   A hypervisor 
is a piece of software, firmware, or hardware that creates and runs one or more virtual 
machines on a host machine (Lee, 2015).  Attacks include disabling the hypervisor, 
gaining control of a virtual machine, or attacking a sibling virtual machine.  A virtual 
machine is a software image that is contained on a host computer, managed by a 
hypervisor, providing isolation from other virtual machines on the same hardware (Lee, 
2015).   
A cloud provider likely would have more privileged users with access to the 
infrastructure.  The cloud environment could lead to more risk from network attacks, 
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account hijacking, privileged user access, and data disposal (Grobauer et al., 2011; Khalil 
et al., 2013).  To access the cloud, the user needs to communicate through the Internet, 
which is untrusted (Grobauer et al., 2011; Khalil et al., 2013).  There is a possibility that 
the network flow to a cloud could be open to vulnerabilities, such as a man-in-the-middle 
attack, where the hacker is positioned between the users and the destination, intercepting 
communications (Grobauer et al., 2011; Khalil et al., 2013).  Cloud providers host several 
companies on their infrastructure, so there are risks of data being exposed if the cloud 
service does not securely erase data before reallocating space to another company’s 
workload.  Encryption is one method that cloud providers and companies that participate 
in public cloud services can utilize to protect data from unauthorized use (Grobauer et al., 
2011; Khalil et al., 2013).   
Insider attacks from within the cloud service provider, such as sharing employee 
security background check information with other customers, also are a risk (Duncan, 
Creese, & Goldsmith, 2012).  Additionally, the customer of a cloud service may be 
unaware of the cloud provider’s policy on bring your own device (BYOD). An 
unmanaged BYOD device could be compromised with malware, and the cloud service 
provider would be unaware of the threat.  If an endpoint, for example a key logger, is 
compromised, customer data could be compromised (Duncan et al., 2012).  Further, 
unless the cloud customer encrypts its data, the cloud providers may have the ability to 
read it (Duncan et al., 2012).  When considering a cloud service, confidentiality of data is 
an important consideration (Jenkins, 2013).  Analyzing encryption alternatives includes 
deciding what data need to be encrypted and securing the management of the encryption 
keys (Jenkins, 2013).  Products that provide the customer of a cloud service the ability to 
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manage and control encryption keys include CipherCloud (2014), which allows a cloud 
user to encrypt data in the cloud but render the data decrypted when displayed within the 
enterprise.    
Cloud security may provide challenges in addition to solutions.  Frost & Sullivan, in 
partnership with Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, conducted a study of over 12,000 information 
security professionals; of the respondents, 56% believe that their security organizations 
were understaffed (Suby, 2013).  However, cloud providers, like Amazon Web Services 
(2014), provide many built-in security services that companies can utilize, which 
decreases the security burden of their staff.  Examples of Amazon Web Services’ security 
capabilities include built-in firewalls, multi-factor authentication, private network subsets, 
encrypted data storage, and hardware-based crypto-key storage.   
Computer services that help companies assess and monitor cloud services also are 
available.  McAfee (2014c) offers cloud security verification services, from deep dive 
testing of the cloud infrastructure to daily security scans of the cloud environment.  To 
help customers feel more comfortable with cloud computing, researchers proposed a 
trust-aware framework to evaluate the security of a cloud environment (Habib, 
Varadharajan, & Muhlhauser, 2013). The trust-aware framework utilizes the trusted 
platform module in hardware, combined with the consensus assessment initiative 
questionnaire developed by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), to provide assurance of 
the cloud provider’s security (Habib et al., 2013).           
Mobile devices are rapidly being incorporated into enterprise solutions (Li & Clark, 
2013).  Companies need to protect their employees’ mobile devices, as they present 
security challenges that are similar to those of desktop computing environments (Li & 
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Clark, 2013); e.g., mobile devices can be infected by malware through an Internet link  a 
user clicks on or through an infected application  the user downloads.  Companies must 
create a secure environment to support business requirements on these mobile platforms 
(PwC, 2013).  Mobile variants of anti-virus software are available on some platforms, but 
mobile operating systems may not allow for independent security solutions on a specific 
vendor’s operating system.   
The proliferation of mobile applications creates additional security exposures; e.g., it 
is easy for users to download new applications to their inadequately secured mobile 
device.  Mobile operating systems, for example, Apple’s iOS, have the ability to be 
jailbroken, bypassing device security (Li & Clark, 2013).  Romer (2014) highlighted that 
the focus should be on protecting the business data.  Multiple vendors provide a 
capability to separate corporate and personal information on a mobile device 
(containerization), which provides additional data protection of company assets 
(Airwatch, 2014; Good, 2014, Hernandez, 2014).  With containerization capabilities, 
companies can control data by storing company information in an isolated container on 
the mobile device.  By utilizing MDM and the containerization capability, companies 
have the ability to monitor the security of the device, control what applications can be 
loaded onto the mobile device, remotely wipe the content if the device is lost or stolen, 
and provide isolation and controls for corporate data (Romer, 2014).   
Willems (2013) described why the Android platform is a sought-after target for 
hackers.  As of 2013, Android had approximately 75% of the smartphone market; 
therefore, any malware targeted toward Android devices would have a large install base.  
Android applications are not vetted by any organization, and users have the ability to 
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install applications to their device.  These two characteristics make Androids susceptible 
to hackers (Willems, 2013), and, therefore, researchers are looking for ways to detect 
malicious code on smartphones.  Further, Dixon and Mishra (2013) analyzed how the rate 
of battery drain could be used to detect malicious code on a smartphone.     
BYOD brings added security threats (O’Neill, 2014).  In addition to users losing 
mobile devices more frequently than PCs, thieves understand that, as well as personal 
data, there is often corporate data stored on the device, or access to corporate systems is 
allowed through the device (O’Neill, 2014).  Steiner (2014) proposed a multi-pronged 
approach to secure mobile BYOD devices, including the use of authentication tokens for 
the web, application, and data access; tight integration with the corporate access rights 
directory; and storing corporate content on the corporate network.   
 
Security Analytics IT 
Companies are realizing they could have a security breach and not be aware it 
occurred (Verizon, 2013).  Verizon reported, in 54% of the data breaches they 
investigated, it took months from the point of initial compromise to the discovery of the 
data breach.  Ponemon Institute (2015) published a study providing data about how fast 
breaches were detected. The mean time to identify a breach was 206 days. The mean time 
to contain a breach was 69 days. Financial services companies are investigating methods 
to detect data breaches closer to the time of compromise.  The earlier a security 
compromise can be detected and remediated, the smaller the window of time exists for 
exfiltration of data or use of the information by the attackers for their specific purposes 
(Radcliff, 2012).   
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Hackers may breach systems for the purposes of sending spam, attacking other 
systems, or stealing data.  One technology being used to detect system compromises and 
prevent security incidents is SIEM tools, which provide the capability to aggregate data-
finding patterns or suspicious activities (Chickowski, 2011; Lozito, 2011; Oltsik, 2013).  
The SIEM market is growing: In 2012, the SIEM software market grew 27.5%, and the 
SIEM appliance market grew 11.9% (Messmer, 2013).   
Tankard (2014) described the changing landscape of hackers and the need for security 
analytics.  Tankard explained that hackers today are using the same cloud services that 
businesses use to lower the suspicion of the location of the attack—which could be a 
well-respected cloud services provider.  Tankard suggested that understanding what data 
are important and using security analytics to understand the use and flow of high-value 
data are approaches that could be used to increase the company’s ability to detect a 
breach. 
Security analytics are evolving to utilize new technology.  Cardenas, Manadhata, and 
Rajan (2013) suggested that the current SIEM tools are too restrictive because they rely 
on structured data that require defined schemas.  They believe that tools that can deal 
with large-scale unstructured data, like Hadoop, are the next-generation security analytic 
tools.    
 
 
Enhanced Security Control IT   
Researchers continue to find new ways to address security issues.  When new 
information technology solutions are enabled for example cloud, mobile, or new business 
applications,  financial services sector companies need to assess if  additional security 
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solutions are needed to support new IT capabilities.  The following are examples of how 
emerging technology and research can provide additional options for financial services 
sector companies to decrease their data security risks.   
Koch, Holzapfel, and Rodosek (2011) developed an approach to keep private the data 
that are stored on social media sites.  The researchers created an architecture that 
provided an encryption extension to the Mozilla Firefox web browser that transparently 
encrypts all data stored on their social media servers.  The authors explained that their 
goal was to produce an easy-to-use solution that could keep data private when stored in a 
web browser.  This type of approach protects data stored outside the enterprise and would 
reduce the chance of data breaches.  Multiple vendors offer this capability (Bromium, 
2015; Spikes, 2015).      
Phishing attacks can compromise user devices though an email that attempts to 
mislead the user by disguising the real source of the email and tries to coerce the user to 
open an attachment or click on a link (Herzberg & Margulies, 2012).  Researchers are 
exploring alternate ways to authenticate users and devices to reduce the possibility of 
being deceived and prevent the use of stolen authentication information (Herzberg & 
Margulies, 2012).  Products available today, such as McAfee’s (2013b) email protection, 
can help companies to reduce phishing attacks.  In addition, Sender Policy Framework 
(SPF) reduces abusive emails and detects forgery by allowing recipients to verify the 
sender’s identity, and Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) allows a sender to 
cryptographically sign the contents of an email and confirm where the email originated.  
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) 
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leverages SPF and DKIM by allowing a company to publish an email policy that declares 
the rules the company uses to determine valid email.         
According to Imperva (2012), current anti-malware solutions detect fewer than 5% of 
newly created viruses.  To address the malware detection gap, new approaches are 
needed.  Xu, Yao, Ma, and Crowell (2011) published an approach to detect malware by 
incorporating system and end-user behavior analysis.  The researchers were addressing 
the charge that 10% of the websites they analyzed contained drive-by-download malware, 
i.e., malware deposited on a user’s machine when the user visits an infected website.  Xu 
et al. focused on file and process creation, monitored file system events and user actions, 
and found patterns in the relationship of the users’ actions and system events.  Using this 
approach, the researchers could detect malware earlier in the cycle, at the onset of the 
infection.  The approach does not rely on new anti-virus signatures, and it provides 
improved malware detection. End user behavior analytics is seeing growth. In a paper by 
Gartner (2015) assessing the market landscape of user and entity behavior analytics, they 
identified multiple solutions seeing high growth. Solutions analyze current behavior and 
detect changes in behavior. Some of the products that Gartner identified providing 
solutions in end user behavior analytics were Dtex, SpectorSoft, Bay Dynamics, 
ObserveIt, and SureView.       
As financial companies utilize cloud computing, security risks should be considered 
(Ginovsky, 2013; Jenkins, 2013; Kothari, 2013).  Ibrahim, Hamlyn-Harris, Grundy, and 
Almorsy (2011) explained that, in a cloud IaaS environment, the cloud provider does not 
have control over or insights into the contents of the hosted Virtual Machine (VM).  VMs 
could be compromised, and the compromised VM could attack the other VMs or the 
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hypervisor.  Consequently, Ibrahim et al. proposed a model that would provide 
transparent and real-time security monitoring of VMs in the cloud.     
       
Security Information-sharing Forums 
 With the growing complexity of cyber attacks, security personnel are sharing 
information regarding attacks with their peers.  Industry-specific ISACs allow members 
to share information with some level of trust (Moriarty, 2011).  ISACs include member 
groups focused on the following sectors: communications, energy, emergency 
management, financial services, healthcare, transportation, IT, maritime, nuclear, public 
transit, research and education, supply chain, and water (National Council of ISACs, 
2013).  Security information-sharing forums could make financial services companies 
aware of a data breach or incident they were previously unaware of.   
FS-ISAC (2013a) was created in 1999 in response to Presidential Directive 63, which 
mandated public and private sector information sharing of physical and cybersecurity 
threats and vulnerabilities to help protect U.S. critical infrastructure. Through FS-ISAC’s 
Critical Infrastructure Notification System (CINS), alerts can be sent to members in near 
real time.  FS-ISAC provides a method to share anonymous information across financial 
services members, allowing the company to not disclose their identity.  The U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, the Office of Comptroller of Currency, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the U.S. Secret Service recommend that financial services 
companies join FS-ISAC, which requires a paid membership to belong. 
The mission of FS-ISAC (2013a) is to work collaboratively with the government and 
financial services sector to share cyber threat information, with the goal of improving the 
security within the financial services sector.  Working together the Department of the 
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Treasury, the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Committee and FS-ISAC enhance 
the ability of financial services to prepare for and respond to a physical or cyber threat.  
An example of the work that FS-ISAC does was highlighted in an interview with Bill 
Nelson, the president of FS-ISAC (Kitten, 2013).  In the interview, Nelson explained how 
FS-ISAC is working across the financial services sector to combat account takeovers and 
DDoS attacks by using technology for anomaly detection.  FS-ISAC has partnered with 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) to create a new company with a 
mission to provide automation and services to aid the automatic ingestion of threat 
information (Soltra, 2015).     
InfraGard (2015) is a partnership between the FBI and the public and private sector.  
InfraGuard has identified the financial services sector as one of the 16 critical 
infrastructures.  State and local law enforcement, academia, and businesses are involved 
in the InfraGard mission to prevent hostile acts against the United States.  Of the Fortune 
500 companies, 300 have representatives involved with InfraGard.     
The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014) is 
a partnership between the FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center.  Its mission 
is to receive, develop, and refer criminal complaints in the area of cyber security.  The 
IC3 also partners with law enforcement and regulatory agencies. 
Sharing forums may not provide all of the benefits needed.  Ring (2014) explained 
that attacks are becoming increasingly personalized, which would make information 
sharing of limited value.  Ring also stated that threat intelligence sources have a high rate 
of false positives, requiring additional work for financial services to investigate, also 
providing limited value.  However, overall, sharing forums may provide information to 
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financial services companies to prevent cyber attacks, or the information may provide 
intelligence to allow the company to discover that a successful attack has taken place.   
 
Best Practices 
NIST (2013a) was founded in 1901 to promote U.S. innovation and industrial 
competitiveness.  The organization consists of approximately 3,000 employees and 2,700 
visiting professionals from academia and industry.  It has a wide range of scope, but its 
four top focus areas are cybersecurity, power grids, electronic health grids, and cloud 
computing (NIST, 2013a).  NIST plays a key role in protecting the critical infrastructure 
from cyber attacks and produced a standard for cybersecurity that was published in 
February 2014 in support of the 2013 Presidential Executive Order.  Some financial 
services companies have been identified as critical infrastructures and are required to 
comply with the NIST cybersecurity standard (Roman, 2013).   
One method that NIST (2013b) uses to advance security best practices is to produce 
standards and guidance for the public and private sectors.  In the area of information 
security, there are many NIST standards, including malware prevention, security patching, 
protection of PII, intrusion detection and prevention, cloud computing, and mobile 
security, to name a few (NIST, 2013b).  In addition to standards, NIST utilizes other 
methods to advance their areas of interest and influence private industry.  For instance, in 
April 2013, NIST announced the creation of the National Cybersecurity Center of 
Excellence (NCCoE).  The NCCoE is a public-private partnership to help industry secure 
data and digital infrastructure.  Eleven private industry companies have joined NCCoE to 
help combat the cybersecurity challenges (NIST, 2013f).   
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NIST offers many publications that provide best practices and guidance to 
government agencies and industry.  NIST Publication 800-83 (NIST, 2013c) is a guide to 
malware incident prevention and handling for desktops and laptops.  Having an approach 
to address malware is very important to prevent data breaches, as 37% of breaches are 
attributed to malware (Mello, 2013).  NIST Publication 800-83 defines malware as 
malicious code that covertly inserts a program into the system with the intent to steal or 
destroy data or run intrusive programs, which can cause widespread damage or disruption.   
Examples of malware described by NIST (2013c) include (a) a virus that inserts 
copies of itself into a host program or data files; (b) worms, self-contained programs that 
propagate without involvement from the user; (c) Trojan horses, which appear to be 
something that they are not, leading the user to be unaware of the malicious code; and (d) 
malicious mobile code, software transmitted to the mobile user, typically without the 
user’s instruction.   
An example of a virus is the Gozi virus, discovered in 2007 (Smith, 2013).  Hackers 
utilized a PDF file to transport it and when the user opened the file, the virus was 
installed.  The virus was focused on stealing bank account numbers, usernames, and 
passwords.  It is estimated that the Gozi virus accessed accounts resulting in the theft of 
tens of millions of dollars (Smith, 2013).   
Conficker, which was discovered in 2008, is an example of a worm.  Conficker 
originally infected Windows system files to target users of networking sites, such as 
Facebook, and mail sites, such as Yahoo, and moved to file shares and removable media.  
It is estimated that Conficker infected seven million computers (Kirk, 2012).   
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Neverquest is a Trojan piece of malware that is spread through malicious email or 
social media sites and is used to steal money from a user’s bank accounts.  It collects 
banking information and, can transfer money or change the user’s credentials (Kassner, 
2013).   
NIST also described multiple attacker tools, including: (a) backdoors, which allow 
the attacker to have access to the system without the knowledge of the system owner; (b) 
keystroke loggers, which transfer data, such as passwords, that are typed into the system; 
(c) rootkits, which install code on the host in such a way that they are difficult to find; (d) 
web browser extensions that monitor all browser traffic; and (e) email generators that 
create spam sent from the victim’s computer (NIST, 2013c). NIST provides technical 
approaches to detect and defend against malware.   
Constantin (2013) described the possible negative effects of a malicious web browser 
extension, which can insert rogue code on a computer to place malicious advertisements 
in web pages or hijack a search query.  The end user can be infected with malicious code 
that could lead to stolen credentials and hijacked accounts, or to bypass two-factor 
authentication (Constantin, 2013).  In 2014, AOL was hacked, and email accounts were 
compromised (Albanesius, 2014).  AOL user accounts had their address books harvested, 
and fake, malicious email was sent, appearing to the recipient that the mail came from the 
(compromised) user’s account (Albanesius, 2014).      
NIST (2013c) described the change in malware over the last several years, from fast 
spreading and easy to notice to stealthy and quiet, making malware more difficult to 
detect.  Malware continually changes, and companies need to utilize IT and information 
security best practices to combat it (Dispensa, 2010). NIST suggested organizations 
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utilize such technology as anti-virus software, intrusion prevention systems, firewalls, 
content filtering and inspection, and application whitelisting to assist with threat 
mitigation.   
NIST (2103c) recommended organizations consider more defensive technical 
approaches to decrease the likelihood of malware infections by using technology such as 
sandboxing, browser separation, and segregation of computer resources.  Detection 
approaches are suggested to analyze systems by looking for patterns in anti-virus and 
intrusion prevention systems (NIST, 2013c).  SIEM technologies provide consolidated 
log file and system alert correlation providing organizations a method to identify systems 
infected by malware (NIST, 2013c).    
Patch management, identified by NIST (2013b) as the process of identifying, 
acquiring, installing, and verifying patches for products and systems with known security 
vulnerabilities, is a key security measure for organizations.  Technology also can assist 
organizations with the patching process.  Patching technology includes scanning tools 
that provide insight into what patches are needed for host systems and network 
monitoring, which can identify applications that need patches (NIST, 2013b).  Further, 
patch management technology can bundle patches for distribution and install software 
(NIST, 2013a).  Technology also can automate certain parts of the patching process to 
ensure that systems are kept to the desired levels (NIST, 2013b).  However, patches also 
can cause applications to have failures.  In November 2013, Microsoft released two 
patches to Outlook that created problems with the Outlook application, and Microsoft 
directed its customers to not install the patches until the company could remediate the 
issues (Leonhard, 2013).     
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Protecting PII is a goal for all organizations subject to regulations related to 
safeguarding individuals’ privacy (NIST, 2010; U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2013a).  NIST’s Publication 800-122 provides guidance on how to protect PII 
(NIST, 2010).  Financial institutions are within the scope of state privacy laws because 
they hold such information as individuals’ bank account numbers, date of birth, social 
security number, and mother’s maiden name.  In most states, regulations require 
companies to report PII loss if the data was not been encrypted (National Conference of 
State Legislators, 2013).   
Focusing on the technology opportunities, NIST (2010) suggested that de-identifying 
information reduces the risk of data loss or misuse.  De-identification of data refers to 
eliminating the link to a specific person (Future of Privacy Forum, 2014).  In addition, 
techniques to mask or replace data provide the ability to protect PII (NIST, 2010).  
Multiple companies provide data-masking technologies to hide sensitive data (Oracle, 
2015; SafeNet, 2015; Vormetric, 2015).  Tse (2014) defined data masking as the act of 
hiding the actual data so that an unauthorized user cannot decipher them.   
Data masking technology is available in multiple forms.  Static data masking, which 
is the most mature, provides masking of data prior to use.  Static data masking is often 
used in test environments, where application tests are performed to verify the function of 
the application, and where the desire is to simulate a production environment without 
exposing sensitive data to the testers (Feiman & Casper, 2012).  Dynamic data masking 
provides obfuscation of data in real time, and data redaction masks unstructured data, 
such as PDF, Word, and Excel files (Feiman & Casper, 2012).    
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NIST Publication 800-94 (NIST, 2012b) also provides guidance for intrusion 
detection and prevention systems.  An intrusion detection system (IDS) is software that 
automates the detection of an attack or malicious piece of code.  An IPS has similar 
capabilities to IDS systems, but can also stop possible security incidents.  An example of 
an IPS stopping an attack was published by Cisco (2014d).  Using Cisco’s own 
technology, they were able to detect a new variant of the Rinbot virus and develop an IPS 
signature to stop the virus (Cisco, 2014d).  Cisco then distributed the signature to their 
customers so that they also could combat the Rinbot virus (Cisco, 2014d).   
An IPS has the ability to terminate network connections that are being used in an 
attack, block access by the attacker’s IP address, and block access to internal or external 
hosts and applications.  NIST (2012b) describes multiple types of IDS and IPS 
capabilities, including: (a) network-based monitoring devices, usually deployed at 
network boundaries, which can monitor network traffic for suspicious activities; for 
example, network-based IPS can set up rules to block source IP addresses, or network 
ports; (b) wireless monitors, which can analyze wireless network; (c) network analysis, 
which examines network traffic for unusual activities; and (d) host-monitoring analysis, 
which monitors hosts for suspicious activities.   
NIST (2012b) described several functions that IDSs and IPSs can provide to detect 
and prevent malicious network traffic.  Threshold values allow the support team to set a 
range of normal values and be alerted when an event hits a specified limit; for example, 
20 failed attempts to connect in 60 seconds would generate an alert.  Blacklists can be 
used to block traffic from certain destinations, and whitelists can be used to identify 
trusted systems (NIST, 2012b). 
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Gartner (2014) predicted a 5% growth in mobile phone shipments, estimating that 1.9 
billion mobile phones would be shipped in 2014.  NIST (2013d) provided security 
guidelines for mobile devices, including: (a) deciding what level of security needs to be 
active for a mobile device to be connected to a company network; (b) deciding what 
corporate applications will be allowed on a company-owned and personally-owned 
mobile device, (c) encrypting data on a mobile device, (d) having the ability to wipe 
corporate data on a mobile device, and (e) detecting when security settings are altered.   
In February 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that focused on 
improving the U.S. critical infrastructure in the face of growing cyber attacks (White 
House, 2013).  The president called for NIST to develop a framework to reduce cyber 
risk, and, in response, NIST published the Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity in February 2014 (NIST, 2014b).  The government is 
coordinating the adoption of the new NIST cyber standard, whereby companies could be 
required to adopt it due to their being identified as part of the critical infrastructure.   
Trope and Humes (2013) provided a legal analysis of the cybersecurity executive 
order.  According to Trope and Humes, the executive order is aimed at improving a 
company’s ability to withstand a cyber attack and/or limiting the damage caused by it.  
Trope and Humes explained that the cybersecurity executive order currently calls for 
voluntary compliance.  Nonetheless, the order could put pressure on companies that are 
identified to be part of the critical infrastructure to improve their cybersecurity.  Major 
electricity generation and distribution facilities, financial services, and transportation 
providers are examples of critical infrastructures (Trope & Humes, 2013).   
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According to Trope and Humes (2013), the U.S. government can notify companies of 
an identified threat in two ways.  An Imminent Target Notice provides a method for the 
U.S. government to communicate to a company that there is a specific cyber threat that is 
targeting it.  Catastrophic Target Notices provide the ability for the U.S. government to 
inform companies that a cybersecurity incident could reasonably occur that affects the 
nation.  Trope and Humes stated, with the new cybersecurity executive order, companies 
would be under pressure by their board of directors to ensure that investments in 
cybersecurity are not delayed.  However, until there is case law related to the 
cybersecurity executive order, companies will not know the government’s level of 
expectations or the government’s ability to enforce an Imminent Target Notice or a 
Catastrophic Target Notice (Trope & Humes, 2013).  In addition, it is unclear the level of 
responsibility to which a company will be held accountable if they are defined as part of 
the critical infrastructure (Trope & Humes, 2013).   
In May 2013, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo initiated an inquiry to the largest 
insurance companies that serve the state’s citizens with regard to their cybersecurity 
program (New York State, 2013).  Specifically, 31 insurance companies were asked to 
disclose any instances of cyber attacks, their current technical capabilities to detect and 
defend against cyber attacks, the number of people and investments targeted to support 
cybersecurity, and the board of director’s oversight to cybersecurity.  In 2013, New York 
State held a cyber security competition among 200 banks to understand and provide 
relative preparedness for a cyber attack (Chaudhuri, 2013).  New York State indicated 
that it hoped to utilize the same tool for insurance (Chaudhuri, 2013).       
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Multiple state and federal regulations require companies to disclose data breaches 
(Mintz Levin, 2015; National Conference of State Legislators, 2013; Singer, 2013).  In 
the absence of overarching federal data breach notification laws, all states except 
Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota have passed legislation that 
requires businesses to disclose information about security breaches (National Conference 
of State Legislators, 2013; Singer, 2013).  Public Internet sites, such as the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse (2015), and Data Loss db (2014), provide a history of data breaches.  For 
specific types of data, for example, health data, the U.S. government requires HIPAA-
regulated companies, such as doctors and hospitals, to disclose data privacy breaches 
(U.S. Department of HHS, 2013b).   
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 requires financial institutions to 
provide customers with copies of their privacy policies and to safeguard customer data 
(Stevens, 2012).  Financial institutions are required to anticipate threats that could lead to 
client’s harm (Stevens, 2012).  The FTC has jurisdiction over the GLBA, and the FTC 
holds financial institutions accountable to assess reasonably foreseeable threats and 
require the institution to update policies, procedures, and controls to protect customer 
data (Stevens, 2012).  Financial institutions also are required to monitor, evaluate, and 
adjust their information security program against regulations and industry best practices 
(Stevens, 2012).   
The FTC has the general authority to levy penalties on companies that do not 
adequately protect consumer data (Stevens, 2012).  The requirements include the need to 
design and implement a safeguard program and to evaluate and adjust the program as 
needed (FTC, 2006).  The penalties can range from monetary fines to consent orders that 
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require companies to implement information security programs (Stevens, 2012).  An 
example of an FTC violation of GLBA concerned Franklin Budget Car Sales Inc. and 
debt collector EPN Inc.  The two companies were found to have peer-to-peer file sharing 
software installed on corporate systems, which led to exposing the PII of thousands of 
consumers; the settlement required both companies to implement comprehensive security 
programs (Nonaka, 2012). 
Breaux and Baumer (2011), in a 10-year retrospective on rulings made by the FTC, 
suggested companies must implement a continuous security improvement program  
requiring ongoing assessments of emerging risks and utilization of industry security best 
practices.  Several factors influence IT security investments, including regulations, 
business enablement, and the changing security threat landscape (Breaux & Baumer, 
2011).  Current federal regulations require a business to have reasonable security controls, 
but the expectation of what is reasonable may change over time (Breaux & Baumer, 
2011).   
One of the ways the U.S. government communicates its view of security best 
practices is through publications of regulations and guidelines.  Some examples of federal 
regulations pertaining to security and data protection requirements can be found in the 
HIPAA, GLBA, and FTC Act (Stevens, 2012).  The FDIC’s (2014) Compliance Manual 
defines requirements to comply with GLBA.  The manual states the institution will be 
audited to ensure a stable compliance audit program exists, that steps are taken to correct 
deficiencies, and audits happen with appropriate frequency.   
International Organization for Standards (ISO) 27002 is a guideline of principles for 
initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management 
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(ISO, 2013).  ISO 27002 provides a wide variety of security controls, including 
implementing a security policy, operational security, secure supplier relationships, and 
compliance (ISO, 2013).  COBIT5 provides best practices for information security by 
defining functional responsibilities for information security, providing guidance for 
effective governance and management of information security, and providing best 
practices for linking information security to enterprise objectives (Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association [ISACA], 2012).      
Security incidents and data breaches may occur from multiple threat vectors.  In 
NIST’s (2012a) Computer Security Incident and Handling Guide, several data loss 
vectors are described.  Data loss vectors can come in many forms, for example, malware 
embedded on removable media that will infect a computer when launched, attacks by a 
disgruntled employee, malware loaded on a user’s machine when he or she visits a web 
site with malicious code, malware embedded in an email, improper usage of data by a 
user, and loss or theft of equipment that holds sensitive data (NIST, 2012a).  NIST 
suggests using the material in the Computer Security Incident and Handling Guide to 
prepare for security incidents, including a response if a security incident should occur.  A 
plethora of best practices exist for financial services companies in protecting information 
and systems from data loss.     
  
Summary 
Heikkila (2009) suggested further research to understand how the use of IT may 
affect data security breaches.  According to Verizon, in most of the breaches, there was a 
delay between the data breach and the discovery.  Verizon reported that, in 54% of the 
data breaches, it took from one to 12 months from the time that the system was initially 
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compromised to the discovery of the data breach.  The literature review explores research 
papers, reports by well-known technology vendors, government-supplied standards and 
policies, and news reports regarding data breaches.  The collection of information 
provided in the literature review established there is a wide variety of threats and new 
information technologies that could lead to increased security threats, as well as multiple 
technologies providing new capabilities to security information and detect compromises.     
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the case study methodology that was used to investigate the 
research question proposed by Heikkila (2009), i.e., Does information security 
technology correlate to increased prevalence of detecting a security breach?  This case 
study expanded on Heikkila’s research question to include questions about the type of 
information technologies that may increase or decrease detection of security incidents 
and breaches.  This chapter includes the research method employed; the case study 
research design, reliability, validity, and format for presenting the results, and the 
resources required.  The chapter concludes with a summary.  
 
Research Methods 
The research method was a case study.  According to Yin (2014), case studies 
contribute knowledge about groups and organizations and are the preferred method when 
(a) the research questions are “how” or “why,” (b) the researcher has little or no control 
over the behavior or event, and (c) the focus of the study is a contemporary phenomenon.  
This research focused on understanding how security incidents and breaches are affected 
by information technologies, such as data loss prevention, SIEM, IPS, MDM , and mobile 
container management.  This research also investigated the reasons why a member of a 
Fortune 500 financial services company observes changes in the number of security 
incidents.  The outcome of this investigation will contribute information to business and 
information security professionals who are tasked with protecting sensitive data.  
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Research Design 
According to Yin (2014), case studies have five components: (a) research questions, 
(b) propositions, (c) units of analysis, (d) logic that links the data to the propositions, and 
(e) criteria for interpreting the findings.  Yin defined research design as a logic plan to 
create the steps needed to bring a researcher from the original questions to the 
conclusions of the study.  Research design addresses what questions to study, what data is 
relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyze the results (Yin, 2014).  
Research Questions 
RQ1: What type of information security products resulted in an increase detection of 
security incidents or breaches? 
RQ2: What types of security information technology result in a decrease of security 
incidents and breaches? 
RQ3: How have cloud and mobile technologies resulted in an increase or decrease in 
data security incidents and breaches?  
RQ4: To what extent can participation in threat information sharing groups, or threat 
intelligence sharing, drive an increase or decrease in the number of security incidents and 
breaches? 
Propositions 
Yin (2014) identified the importance of describing propositions that are linked to 
research questions.  According to Yin, propositions help the researcher to look for 
relevant evidence and reflect on the theoretical issue.  In addition, case studies should be 
based on multiple sources (Yin, 2014).  Table 1 presents the research questions, 
propositions, referenced sources, and planned interviews. 
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Table 1.  Propositions  
Proposition Corresponding RQ Source of Evidence Reference Support 
Proposition 1: SIEM 
and advanced 
persistent threat 
(APT) tools can 
detect attacks. 
RQ1: What type of 
information security 
products resulted in 
an increase detection 
of security incidents 
or breaches?  
Document review 
Interview  
Cybenko & 
Landwehr, 2012; 
Gabriel, Hoppe, 
Pastwa, & Sowa, 
2009 
Proposition 2: SIEM 
and APT tools can 
increase the number 
of incident or 
breaches because 
the company 
becomes aware of 
more events. 
RQ1: What type of 
information security 
products resulted in 
an increase detection 
of security incidents 
or breaches? 
Document review 
Interview 
Cybenko & 
Landwehr, 2012; 
Gabriel, Hoppe, 
Pastwa, & Sowa, 
2009 
Proposition 3: SIEM 
and APT tools can 
provide companies 
with methods to 
detect and stop an 
attack faster than 
before the tools 
were installed.  
RQ1: What type of 
information security 
products resulted in 
an increase detection 
of security incidents 
or breaches? 
Document review 
Interview 
Cybenko & 
Landwehr, 2012; 
Gabriel, Hoppe, 
Pastwa, & Sowa, 
2009; Lewis, 2013 
Proposition 4: 
Information 
technology products 
exist that drive 
down the 
occurrences of data 
security incidents or 
breaches. 
RQ2: What types of 
security information 
technology result in a 
decrease of security 
incidents and 
breaches? 
Document review 
Interview 
Alsuhibany, 
Morisset, & van 
Moorsel, 2013; Bau, 
Bursztein, Gupta, & 
Mitchell (2010); 
CyberArk, 2014; 
Lewis, 2013  
Proposition 5: 
Utilizing new 
technologies 
increase the number 
of data security 
incidents and 
breaches.  
RQ3: How have 
cloud and mobile 
technologies resulted 
in an increase or 
decrease in data 
security incidents 
and breaches? 
Document review 
Interview 
Kothari, 2013; Li & 
Clark, 2013 
(Table continues)
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Table 1 (Continued)  
Proposition Corresponding RQ Source of Evidence Reference Support 
Proposition 6: 
Utilizing new 
information 
technology in 
concert with new 
information security 
defense technology 
protections reduces 
the likelihood of 
data security 
incidents and 
breaches. 
RQ3: How have 
cloud and mobile 
technologies 
resulted in an 
increase or decrease 
in data security 
incidents and 
breaches? 
Document review 
Interview 
Kothari, 2013 
Proposition 7: 
Utilizing threat 
sharing information 
provides a company 
a mechanism to 
reduce the number 
of data security 
incidents and 
breaches. 
RQ4: To what 
extent can 
participation in 
threat information 
sharing groups, or 
threat intelligence 
information sharing, 
drive an increase or 
decrease in the 
number of security 
incidents and 
breaches?   
Document review 
Interview 
Lemos, 2013  
Proposition 8: 
Utilizing threat 
sharing information 
without the security 
information 
technology to 
consume and defend 
against the threat 
will increase the 
awareness of data 
security incidents 
and breaches. 
RQ4: To what 
extent can 
participation in 
threat information 
sharing groups, or 
threat intelligence 
information sharing, 
drive an increase or 
decrease in the 
number of security 
incidents and 
breaches?   
Document review 
Interview 
Moriarty, 2013; 
Ollmann, 2013 
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Unit of Analysis 
Yin (2014) maintained that researchers should define the scope of the case, or the unit 
of analysis.  For this study, the unit of analysis is Fortune 500 financial services 
companies.  In addition, according to Yin, one of the most important sources of case 
study evidence is the interview, as it is expected to be more fluid than rigid.  Yin 
suggested interview questions be phrased with how and why and that shorter case study 
interviews should last about an hour.  The case study included interviews of nine Fortune 
500 financial services security leaders.  Due to the sensitivity of the topic, there were no 
recording of the interview sessions.     
Linking Data to Propositions 
According to Yin (2014), pattern matching is one of the most desirable techniques for 
case study analysis.  Pattern matching involves comparing the findings from the case 
study with the predictive statements made before the researchers collect data (Yin, 2014).  
Yin indicated that the researcher should state the predicted propositions prior to the start 
of the investigation and compare the results to the original predictions; if the predicted 
patterns are similar to the results, the case study has stronger internal validity.   
Findings Interpretation 
According to Yin (2014), data triangulation strengthens the construct validity of a 
case study.  In this analysis, the goal was to analyze multiple sources of data, such as 
documents, archival records, and interviews.  This case study references multiple sources 
of evidence, including research papers, media stories, and technology papers published 
by technology vendors.  
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Reliability  
Yin (2014) defined a case study protocol that the researcher should use to increase the 
reliability of the study.  This protocol included developing case study questions and 
propositions, creating data collection questions, addressing rival explanations, 
maintaining a chain of evidence, and organizing documentation in a case study database.   
 A chain of evidence links the case study questions to the sources of data.  When 
research data are stored in a case study database, linkages will be improved for use in a 
case study report, increasing reliability.  The interviews of information security 
professionals in Fortune 500 financial services companies were anonymous.  In the case 
study database, a chain of evidence was maintained to ensure that the data can be tied 
back to one specific, anonymous person representing a Fortune 500 financial services 
company. 
According to Yin (2014), creating a case study database will help to organize the 
documentation and data collection and increase the reliability of the case study.  The case 
study database typically includes interviews, tabular materials, observations, document 
analysis, and analysis of data. 
 
Validity 
Internal validity can be strengthened when a cause-effect link can be made, including 
showing the rejection of rival hypotheses (Yin, 2014).  External validity relates to the 
extent that the findings of the case study can be analytically generalized to other 
situations (Yin, 2014).  According to Yin, when empirical and predictive patterns appear 
to be similar, a case study’s results can demonstrate stronger internal validity.  Yin 
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suggests that, to improve external validity, the researcher replicate logic by using a 
multiple-case study design.   
Yin (2014) defined construct validity as the accuracy in which a case study’s 
measures reflect the concepts being studied.  Yin suggested that, to increase construct 
validity, the researcher cite multiple sources of evidence, maintain a chain of evidence, 
and enable a review of the draft case study conclusions by key informants.     
 
Format for Presenting Results 
Yin (2014) identified multiple sections of a case study report.  The researcher should 
(a) identify the research questions, (b) define the cases that will be studied, (c) connect 
the research question and the data, (d) consider rival conclusions, (e) describe how the 
data was collected, (f) explain the analysis methods used, (g) identify the sources of data, 
(h) explain any unexpected difficulties, (i) describe the method of analysis, and (j) 
identify any shortcomings of the design or analysis.  Yin’s outline was utilized, in 
addition to the Nova Southeastern University Dissertation Guide available for the 
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences (GSCIS) for doctoral students, 
for the case study report.  
 
Resources Required 
To complete the literature review, access to the online Nova Southeastern library as 
well as general Internet access was required, which provides a connection to the 
dissertation tracking system, guidelines for creating dissertations, general media articles, 
industry papers, and government documents.  Many journal articles were referenced from 
MIS Quarterly, IEEE Security & Privacy, Computer Fraud & Security, and 
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Communications of the ACM.  Vendor papers were referenced from IBM, Verizon, 
McAfee, CISCO, FireEye, and Symantec.  Government documents were retrieved from 
the White House, NIST, CERT, HHS, SEC, and the U.S. Senate.  From the Nova 
Southeastern electronic library, journal articles and dissertations were accessed.   
The research benefited from the expertise of the dissertation chair and dissertation 
committee for overall direction and guidance.  The dissertation chair reviewed the survey 
instrument (Appendix B). The Institution Review Board (IRB) processes were utilized to 
gain approval before conducting interviews.  
Finding a set of security leaders from Fortune 500 financial services companies is 
difficult because companies avoid sharing sensitive information security data (Doherty & 
Fulford, 2005; Heikkila, 2009; Wiant, 2005).  Existing relationships with financial 
services companies were utilized, where a level of trust had already been established with 
chief information security officers (CISOs) and managers who lead security teams.  Data 
was anonymous and not tied back to a specific person or company, which increased the 
number of people who were willing to participate.  Each interview and all associated data 
tied to that interview will be retained as a chain of evidence.   
 
Summary 
Heikkila (2009) suggested that research be done to understand how information 
technology corresponds to the prevention or reduction of security breaches.  To 
understand how technology may correspond to a security incident or breach, a case study 
was performed of Fortune 500 financial services information security professionals.  A 
case study was chosen to understand how security incident and breaches have changed 
and why the information security professionals at Fortune 500 companies believe they 
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have seen a change.  Nine information security professionals of Fortune 500 financial 
services companies were targeted for an interview.  Yin’s (2014) pattern-matching 
approach for the case study analysis was utilized. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
This chapter contains the results of the case study.  It begins with a review of the 
goals, methodology, information gathered from the interviews, data analysis, and findings 
with regard to the propositions.  The chapter concludes with a summary.   
 
Review of the Methodology 
The goal of this dissertation is to gain a deeper understanding on how information 
technology can increase awareness of a security incident or breach, and can also decrease 
security incidents and breaches. This dissertation also explores how threat information 
sharing increases awareness or decreases information security incidents and breaches. A 
case study was used as a research approach because case studies are a preferred method 
when (a) the research questions are “how” or “why,” (b) the researcher has little or no 
control over the behavior or event, and (c) the focus of the study is a contemporary 
phenomenon (Yin, 2014).  Following Yin’s approach for case studies, documentation 
review and interviews were utilized to analyze the stated propositions. Interviews of 
Fortune 500 security leaders were a critical element of the study. Nine Fortune 500 
financial services security leaders were interviewed.  The participants were CISOs or 
managers within the information security teams.  The job titles of the participants 
included Senior Vice President Chief Information Security Officer, Senior Vice President 
Information Technology, Vice President Chief Information Security Officer, and Chief 
Information Security Officer. All interview participants were men. All the participants 
were previous acquaintances through security industry conferences or meetings. All 
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interviews were performed over the phone and took an hour or less to complete.  See 
Appendix B for the questions posed to the interview participants. Notes from the 
interview were and mailed the summary of the interview to the participant.  Participants 
were offered to make any corrections to the transcribed answers. One participant 
provided a correction to the interview notes. A numbering scheme was utilized to 
represent each interview, but the notes did not contain the interviewer’s name or 
company.  A log of the names of all of the participants was retained including their 
mailing address, email address, and signed consent form.  Postal mail was utilized to 
ensure maximum confidentiality of the participants. After the interviews were completed, 
each interview participant was mailed a summary of all the anonymous interview data. 
The study utilized pattern matching and explanation building when performing case study 
analysis, as defined by Yin (2014). Participants are referred to as A1 through A9. See 
Appendix C for the interview participant’s responses.   
 
Data Analysis 
This section provides the research questions, propositions, and proposition findings. 
RQ1: What type of information security products result in an increased detection of 
security incidents and breaches?    
Proposition 1: SIEM and APT tools can detect attacks. 
Proposition 2: SIEM and APT tools can increase the number of incidents or breaches 
because the company becomes aware of more events. 
Proposition 3: SIEM and APT tools can provide companies with methods to detect 
and stop an attack faster than before the tools were installed. 
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Proposition 1 Finding: The responses from Interview Question 1A show that every 
company has been investing in SIEM, log management, or advanced network monitoring 
to understand APTs.  The responses from Interview Questions 1B and 1C (see Appendix 
C) indicate that the companies were able to detect security incidents faster, with better 
correlation of multiple sources of data.  Taking into account the interview data and 
triangulation of referenced material (Cybenko & Lanwehr, 2012; Gabriel et al., 2009), 
Proposition 1 was supported.   
In addition to SIEM and APT tools, many other technologies were highlighted that 
provider greater detection of information security incidents.  Some of the technologies 
mentioned were endpoint protection, which is able to detect malicious behavior;  
detecting malicious email; DDOS attacks; detecting large file transfers leaving the 
company; having a service provider scan the network for Indicators of Compromise 
(IOCs); decrypting network traffic that leaves the enterprise to interrogate for malicious 
activities; and detecting communication to malicious websites. 
 Eight out of the nine interviewees mentioned they were monitoring their company 
network to increase awareness of security incidents and breaches. Four of the nine 
interviewees mentioned using information technology to detect malicious code on the 
endpoint to increase awareness of security incidents and breaches. Two of the nine 
participants mentioned the use of DLP to detect security incidents and breaches. Some 
approaches were only mentioned by one interviewee. Interviewee A2 identified the use of 
monitoring active directory access rights. Interviewee A4 identified decrypting network 
traffic to interrogate the contents of the communications. Interview participant A2 
identified the use of next generation firewalls as a key technology to increase awareness 
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of security incidents and breaches. Next generation firewalls provide a deeper inspection 
of data entering or traversing the network, with the ability to reroute or block network 
traffic. Both A2 and A4 identified the use of monitoring directory permission changes. 
Utilizing this technology, the interview participants were able to detect if a hacker or 
malicious insider was altering access rights to implement an attack on the system. 
Interview participant A4 identified the approach of decrypting and interrogating network 
traffic to look for malicious activities. Malicious actors can utilize encryption to hide data 
exfiltration from the network. Bluecoat’s SSL visibility appliance (2015) is an example 
of a solution that unencrypts SSL traffic so a company can gain visibility into data 
leaving the network. Encryption can create a blind spot for advanced malware (Bluecoat, 
2015). Interview participants A7 and A9 identified the importance of employees 
identifying SPAM, and how the security teams utilized the information to search for 
IOCs. The answers demonstrate the connection of people, process, and technology to 
detect security incidents and breaches.  
A5 and A8 mentioned utilizing professional services, where the service provider 
brought in their own tools to detect security issues.  Utilizing professional services to 
bring in unique tools, allowed the interview participants to gain insight into their 
networks without buying and installing new security information technology. Interview 
participants changed service providers every year, with the belief that this approach 
provided the chance for finding exposures that might have been missed by the other 
service provider. A7 identified monitoring cloud services to ensure the use of the cloud 
service was authorized by the company.  
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Future research could explore the effectiveness of these technologies. A possible 
weakness in the study is that the interview question asked the participants to focus on 
technology installed within the last three years. Without a complete inventory of 
technology installed, commonality or differences could be missed. Future research could 
compare the total inventory of security products installed, and their effectiveness. The 
interview data exposes many other security technologies that provide increased detection 
of an attack in addition to SIEM and APT tools. Some examples are detecting large file 
transfers leaving the company network. A short coming of the research design was the 
narrow proposition, but the questions provided a means to gain a richer set of answers 
from the participants.            
Proposition 2 Finding: Proposition 2 suggests that SIEM and APT tools cause an 
increase in the detection of data security incidents and breaches.  Using the responses 
from Interview Question 1D, and triangulating with referenced material (Cybenko & 
Lanwehr, 2012; Gabriel et al., 2009), Proposition 2 was supported.  The interviews 
identified several similar answers, where participants highlighted that, without the 
security detection technology, they would have been blind to the security threat.   
Interviewees A1 and A7 highlighted that they are detecting  increased threats and 
have larger  attack surfaces to protect. Both A2 and A9 mentioned that they measured the 
effectiveness of new security information technology, and could demonstrate 
improvements in decreased security incidents and improved penetration results.  A3 
identified that DLP provided insights into broken business processes, ultimately 
decreasing security incidents and breaches once addressed. What is striking is the 
multiple ways that the participants described their increased awareness of security 
81 
 
 
incidents and breaches. Words like visibility, insights, awareness, and seeing more details 
were used. Many of the interview participants described that the technology allowed 
them to react quicker by using words like quarantined and isolated faster, detected earlier 
in the attack, detected and stopped attack, and detected information quicker. Participant 
A7 identified that additional staff was needed to analyze the data provided by the security 
technology.       
A possible short coming of the research design, and future research opportunity is to 
explore in more depth how increased awareness of security incidents and breaches led to 
improved security for the enterprise.  Utilizing answers from A2 and A9, we know data 
exists that increased awareness of security incidents and breaches can lead to improved 
security, because A2 and A4 had metrics to support their improvements. The information 
security identified by the interview participants spanned many other technologies in 
addition to SIEM and APT tools.     
Proposition 3 Finding: Proposition 3 suggests that information security products can 
detect and stop security threats.  Using triangulation of interview data and referenced 
material (Cybenko & Lanwehr, 2012; Gabriel et al., 2009; Lewis, 2013), Proposition 3 
was supported.  The results of Interview Questions 1D and 1E show that the participants 
were consistent in highlighting that technology gave their teams the ability to detect a 
threat earlier in the attack cycle and stop the threat.  Five out of the nine interviewees 
mentioned that the information technology they have installed in the last three years has 
provided their teams increased ability to detect and react to a threat quicker. Six of the 
nine participants stated that new security information technology pointed out security 
threats that in the past they would have been unaware. The participants used many ways 
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to describe how they detected and stopped security threats. Some examples where they 
would not have found the compromise without the new technology, and that without the 
new technology they would have been oblivious of the attack. Without the new 
technology they would have caught the compromise much later in the attack cycle. An 
interview participant identified the use of information technology that could identify what 
“normal” network traffic was and monitor for “not normal”. This technology capability 
allows the company to possibly detect a hacker taking over a user’s access.  
RQ2: What types of security information technology result in a decrease of security 
incidents and breaches?   
Proposition 4: Information technology products exist that drive down the occurrences 
of data security incidents and breaches. 
Proposition 4 Finding: Proposition 4 states information technology products exist that 
can decrease the occurrence of data security incidents and breaches.  Utilizing the 
interview data and referenced material (Alsuhibany et al., 2013; Bau et al., 2010; 
CyberArk, 2014; Lewis, 2013), Proposition 4 was supported. The participants identified 
multiple IT security capabilities that decreased the occurrence of data security incidents.  
The prevention technologies mentioned most often were blocking malicious web sites, 
DLP, and application whitelisting.  Other technologies highlighted were patching the 
infrastructure, blocking command and control servers, privileged user management, host 
IPSs, phishing programs, vulnerability scanning, and SPAM filtering.   
The participants believed they experienced fewer security incidents because these 
technical capabilities reduced the amount of malware entering their systems, and the 
technology pointed out processes that could be enhanced to improve security.  Two of the 
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nine participants specifically mentioned their new technology decreased malware 
infections entering their systems though email. Analyzing answers from both questions 
2D and 2E, almost every participant mentioned that new security information technology 
allowed their teams to react faster. One participant highlighted specific security 
technology that identified application code vulnerabilities, and had provided data that 
helped facilitate conversations with application code developers, leading to improved 
code development. Three of the nine participants interviewed mentioned new information 
security technology identified broken processes they were able to address. Some 
participants mentioned technology that was not repeated consistently by other 
participants. Examples of some unique technologies mentioned were whitelisting, next-
generation firewalls, and application vulnerability scanning.  
Reflecting on the interview data from Question 2, many of the same technologies that 
were also mentioned in Question 1. It could be concluded that the same technology that 
provided greater awareness of security incidents and breaches also provided a mechanism 
to decrease security incidents and breaches. Examples were dissecting SSL traffic to look 
for malicious traffic, next generation firewalls, identifying anomalous behaviors, and 
application vulnerability scanning. The interview participants had a focus on security 
technology that could prevent malware, including patching, blocking websites, and 
preventing applications from being exploitable by hackers. One interview participant 
mentioned improved patching multiple times. Patching is not an advanced technology, 
but is a foundational element in information security. There was a theme of activities that 
interview participants mentioned. The participants were focused on decreasing malware 
through patching, blocking malicious websites, and eliminating malicious SPAM. The 
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participants decreased the chance of security incidents and breaches by hosting 
application code with less security vulnerabilities.  Security technology was used for 
increased awareness of security incidents and breaches, and decreasing security incidents 
and breaches.         
Without a complete list of technologies each company is using, there is a possibility 
of more commonality than was extracted from the interviews. Future research could track 
the improvements in the amount of time to detect and remediate a security incident or 
breach.    
RQ3: How have new technologies, for example, cloud and mobile technologies, 
resulted in an increase or decrease in data security incidents and breaches, and has the 
technology strengthened or weakened enterprise security?    
Proposition 5: Utilizing new technologies increases the number of data security 
incidents and breaches. 
Proposition 6: Utilizing new information technology in concert with new information 
security defense technology protections reduces the likelihood of data security incidents 
and breaches. 
Proposition 5 Finding: Proposition 5 states that utilizing new technologies increases 
the number of data security incidents and breaches. Utilizing the answers from Interview 
Question 3B, Proposition 5 was not supported. The majority of the respondents did not 
see an increase in the risk of using cloud services or mobile devices.  In almost every 
interview, the participants identified increased usage with mobile devices. Usage spanned 
from limited use of mobile for email, calendar, and contacts to support of many mobile 
applications. In almost all cases, participants highlighted the increased use of the cloud, 
85 
 
 
but again the answers spanned from no use of cloud to a business decision to consider 
cloud first. The participants did not identify any situations that created a security incident 
or breach using cloud technology, and only one security incident on the mobile platform.  
Analyzing the interview responses, it is striking the variety of utilization of mobile and 
cloud technologies, resulting in a consistent view that there have been no or isolated 
security incidents and breaches on mobile devices and cloud services. The use of mobile 
devices included the support of employee owned without company MDM management, 
to strongly managed devices with MDM and containerization. Only one interview 
participant mentioned a mobile malware infection on the Android platform. Cloud usage 
spanned from no use of cloud services to choosing cloud as the first choice as a hosting 
platform. . One interview participant believed the risk of a security incident or breach 
increased, but that there was no data to support that belief. Future research could consider 
the differences of incidents and breaches between different financial services companies 
that have avoided the use of cloud services to companies that consider cloud services as 
their first choice as a hosting platform. 
Proposition 6 Finding: Proposition 6 states that utilizing new security technology to 
address expanded information technology reduces the likelihood of data security 
incidents and breaches. Proposition 6 was supported because the participants identified 
that, in some cases, cloud and mobile technology provided better security for a specific 
use. Alternatively, in every case, interview participants had identified technology used to 
secure both mobile and external cloud environments. The participants identified several 
pieces of technology that they utilized to improve the security of new enterprise 
technology.  Almost every participant mentioned the use of MDM and containerization to 
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secure mobile devices. When asked about the increased risk of expanded use of mobile 
devices, most participants did not see any increased risk. Only one participants identified 
increased security incidents or breaches related to the mobile or cloud platform. To 
protect against security incidents and breaches when using cloud services, the participants 
mentioned utilizing data encryption and monitoring usage of cloud services so that 
employees would be limited to using public cloud services that were approved by 
information security.   
Utilizing the interview data, the study determined that several participants viewed the 
external cloud environment as more secure than their internal infrastructure.  Participants 
mentioned that the external cloud services environment were less complex and more 
locked down than was their internal infrastructure.  The concerns the interview 
participants raised was ensuring the company utilized only security-vetted cloud services 
and enforcement of a secure design when using the authorized cloud service.  The 
participants described their use of information technology and processes to ensure that 
employees were using only sanctioned cloud services.  Participants were not consistent in 
their view of risk related to the cloud platform. Feedback from the interview related to 
comparing the security of an on premise solution to a cloud solution ranged from weaker 
to more robust. As more workloads move to the cloud in both software-as-a-service and 
infrastructure-as-a-service model, there is an opportunity for additional research relating 
to the security differences of alternate cloud offerings. None of the participants 
mentioned experiencing any security incidents or breaches on cloud platforms, to date, 
and only one mobile malware incident. Future research could reconsider this research 
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question, if there are future major breaches with popular cloud service providers or 
mobile platforms.        
In interview question 3C, participant A8 mentioned the use of virtualization as a 
technology to decrease security incidents. Future research could focus on the 
effectiveness of utilizing virtualization technology to secure an enterprise.    
RQ4: To what extent can participation in threat-information sharing groups, or threat 
intelligence information sharing, increase awareness of security incidents and breaches?       
Proposition 7: Utilizing threat sharing information provides a company a mechanism 
to reduce the number of data security incidents and breaches. 
Proposition 8: Utilizing threat sharing information increases awareness of security 
incidents and breaches. 
Proposition 7 Finding: Proposition 7 states that utilizing threat-sharing information 
reduces the number of security incidents and breaches.  Proposition 7 was supported by 
several interview responses. All the participants interviewed were member of FS-ISAC, 
and several participated in additional threat-sharing organizations.  The interview 
participants provided limited examples of where their participation in threat-sharing 
forums was tied to preventing specific incidents and breaches.  The information that FS-
ISAC provided to member companies with respect to the DDOS attacks against financial 
services companies was the only example given of an avoided security incident, which 
multiple interview participants mentioned.  Several interview participants mentioned the 
DDOS example as a specific piece of information they utilized that reduced their security 
incidents.  In general, there was a consistent theme from several participants, i.e., that the 
amount of information provided by FS-ISAC was too hard to consume and not specific 
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enough to avoid a targeted cyber attack.  Some participants were trying to automate 
ingestion of threat information. Analyzing the participant interview data, it is striking the 
variety of answers. Many interview participants seemed overwhelmed with the data 
received from FS-ISAC. The value of FS-ISAC that was highlighted was the professional 
exchange with other members, information about wire transfer scams, and the ability to 
utilize information shared about cyber threat trends with the business. To gain the most 
out of FS-ISAC may require more involvement with FS-ISAC than ingesting the daily 
information bulletins.      
Four of the nine participants identified intelligence related to DDOS attacks was very 
useful in decreasing the likelihood of a security incident. One of nine participants 
identified specific intelligence related to their involvement around a public event was 
very useful in avoiding a security incident.     
Proposition 8 Finding: Proposition 8 suggests that utilizing threat-sharing 
information will increase awareness of security incidents and breaches. Proposition 8 was 
not consistently supported by a majority of participants interviewed.    In one interview 
A4 identified a situation where they utilized threat information to avoid a security 
incident, specifically, very actionable intelligence related to a public event the company 
was involved. Multiple participants identified intelligence assisted them with defending 
against DDOS attacks. It is possible that, after applying the threat intelligence 
information to an institution’s security infrastructure, the company was unaware of how 
that new control prevented a security incident or breach. Considering the focus of threat 
information sharing by the US Government, it is surprising the lack of examples about 
the effectiveness of threat intelligence ingested.    
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Table 2 presents a summary of the information regarding the propositions.  It includes 
the proposition’s corresponding research question and whether or not the proposition was 
supported. 
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Table 2.  Summary of Results  
Proposition Corresponding RQ Results 
Proposition 1: SIEM and 
APT tools can detect 
attacks. 
RQ1: What types of 
information security products 
result in an increased 
detection of security incidents 
and breaches?   
Interview participants and 
other reference material 
supported the proposition. 
Proposition 2: SIEM and 
APT tools can increase 
the number of incidents 
or breaches because the 
company becomes 
aware of more events. 
RQ1: What types of 
information security products 
result in an increased 
detection of security incidents 
and breaches?  
Interview participants and 
other reference material 
supported the proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: SIEM and 
APT tools can provide 
companies with methods 
to detect and stop an 
attack faster than before 
the tools were installed.   
RQ1: What types of 
information security products 
result in an increased 
detection of security incidents 
and breaches?  
Interview participants and 
other reference material 
supported the proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: 
Information technology 
products exist that drive 
down the occurrences of 
data security incidents 
and breaches. 
Proposition 5: Utilizing 
new technologies 
increase the number of 
data security incidents 
and breaches. 
 
RQ2: What types of security 
information technology result 
in a decrease of security 
incidents and breaches?  
 
 
RQ3: How have cloud and 
mobile technologies resulted 
in changes to the frequency of 
data security incidents and 
breaches, and has the 
technology strengthened or 
weakened enterprise security? 
Interview participants and 
other reference material 
supported the proposition.  
 
 
 
Information collected from 
interview participants did 
not support the proposition 
Proposition 6: Utilizing 
new information 
technology in concert 
with new information 
security defense 
technology protections 
reduces the likelihood of 
data security incidents 
and breaches. 
RQ3: How have new 
technologies, for example, 
cloud and mobile 
technologies, resulted in 
changes to the frequency of 
data security incidents and 
breaches, and has the 
technology strengthened or 
weakened enterprise security? 
Information collected 
from interview 
participants supported the 
proposition.   
 
(Table continues)
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Proposition Corresponding RQ Results 
Proposition 7: Utilizing 
threat sharing 
information provides a 
company a mechanism to 
reduce the number of 
data security incidents 
and breaches. 
RQ4: To what extent can 
participation in threat-
information sharing groups, or 
threat intelligence information 
sharing, increase awareness of 
security incidents and 
breaches?    
Interview participants and 
other reference material 
supported the proposition. 
Proposition 8: Utilizing 
threat sharing 
information increases 
awareness of security 
incident and breaches.   
RQ4: To what extent can 
participation in threat-
information sharing groups, or 
threat intelligence information 
sharing, increase awareness of 
security incidents and 
breaches?    
Information collected from 
interview participants was 
not consistent in the support 
of the proposition.   
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Summary of Results 
When the interview participants were describing the technology they installed to 
increase awareness and detect a security incident or breach, compared to the technology 
they installed to prevent a security incident or breach, the proportional level of effort that 
the interview participants described as being applied to detection capabilities compared to 
preventive capabilities was striking.  Analyzing the interview data and factoring in the 
discussion, it was observed that Fortune 500 financial services companies identified 
about twice as many examples of detection vs. prevention technologies utilized in the 
past three years.  Many of the participants stated that, without the new technology, they 
either would have never found the security issue or would have found it much later in the 
attack cycle. 
There was a lack of incidents and breaches mentioned by the interview participants 
on mobile platforms.  The interview participants seemed confident in the technology that 
they applied to secure mobile devices.  An alternate explanation to the lack of incidents is 
that the participants interviewed may not be aware of a security incident on their mobile 
devices.  According to McAfee (McAfee Labs, 2015), mobile malware has increased 
50% in the first half of 2015 compared to 2014.  McAfee suggests that mobile malware is 
in the early stages of effectiveness, and to date the malware has not been serious or broad 
based.  The security of mobile devices could be reconsidered if serious, broad-based 
attacks materialize.     
The majority of the interview participants considered vetted cloud service providers 
to be more secure than their internal IT infrastructure.  Financial services companies are 
highly regulated, so the position that cloud services are highly secure is noteworthy.  An 
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interview participant stated that the lack of visibility into security issues regarding cloud 
services was a concern.  There was a question as to whether the external cloud services 
are as secure as the interview participants believe they are, or if the participants are 
informed of security issues the cloud service providers may have. 
Considering the proposed legislation to increase threat sharing between the U.S. 
government and the private sector (U.S. Congress, 2015), it was surprising that almost 
every participant interviewed seemed overwhelmed with the amount of threat information 
received through FS-ISAC and struggled to identify specific situations the threat 
information provided  to prevent a security incident or breach.  One possible explanation 
is that the individuals interviewed were CISOs or senior information security leaders 
within their company and it is possible that someone on their staff was dealing with the 
threat intelligence and the interview participants were unaware of the specific incidents 
the daily threat information was preventing.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
This chapter provides the conclusions of this study, along with limitations and 
recommendations for future areas of research.  The chapter concludes with a summary. 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to explore how IT security related to the prevalence of 
detecting a security incident or breach.  Heikkila’s (2009) dissertation focused on 
studying the relationship between the existence of a security policy and the proposition 
that a security policy could lead to decreased security incidents and breaches.  Her 
dissertation did not find a statistically significant relationship between these two variables.  
Heikkila observed that, in some cases, newer IT security provided increased awareness of 
security incidents and breaches.  Heikkila suggested further research to explore the 
relationship of IT security to increased detection of security incidents and breaches.   
The first research question in this study explored whether IT security provided 
increased awareness of security incidents and breaches.  Using triangulation, as described 
by Yin (2014), along with referenced material and interviews with nine leaders of 
information security in Fortune 500 financial service companies, the case study 
determined that IT security can increase detection of security incidents and breaches and 
strengthen enterprise information security.  Interview participants highlighted SIEM 
technology, technology to scan infrastructure for IOCs, and advanced endpoint 
technology to identify anomalous behavior as some of these technologies used to identify 
security incidents they would have been unaware of in the past.   
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Cybenko and Landwehr (2012) noted the difference between information security and 
other safety programs, for example, automobile safety.  With automobile safety, prior to 
2012 there was not much change, but with information security, there are constant 
changes by attackers, defenders, vendors, policymakers, and decision makers.  Cybenko 
and Landwehr proposed that SIEM is a necessary ingredient to defend against attackers.  
To address the full spectrum of adversaries, SIEM consolidates large amounts of security 
event data that spans multiple systems.  Use of SIEM technology could lead institutions 
to discover security incidents of which they were previously unaware (Gabriel, Hoppe, 
Pastwa, & Sowa, 2009).  SIEM technology allows companies to interpret security log 
data from network logs and access control information.  Lewis (2013) explained that a 
SIEM tool cannot stop an attack, but the technology allows an institution to contain the 
attack and mitigate the possible damages by identifying the threat and taking action 
before the attacker becomes entrenched in their network. According to Verizon (2013), 
most of the breaches experienced a delay between the data breach and its discovery.  
Verizon reported that breaches may take months or years to discover and that, in most 
cases, third parties discovered the breaches.   
The second research question explored what security technology was used to decrease 
security incidents and breaches.  Utilizing triangulation of referenced material and 
interviews with security leaders working for financial services companies, the case study 
concluded that recently installed security technology decreased security incidents and 
breaches.  Multiple companies have seen decreases in security incidents and breaches 
with technologies, including blocking malicious web sites, DLP, and application 
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whitelisting.  The security technologies mentioned by the interview participants reduced 
malware infections, thereby decreasing security incidents and breaches.  
IT security provides protection of informational assets for companies.  Examples of 
IT security are access controls, endpoint controls, network controls, and host controls.  
Lewis (2012) suggested that companies deploy solutions that control privileged user 
accounts by auditing and logging all activities.  CyberArk (2014) claims that misuse of 
privileged accounts, that provide elevated access rights, represent the largest security 
vulnerability that organizations have.  Privileged users have elevated administrator access 
to systems, but this elevated access in the hands of a malicious user or hacker could alter 
IT infrastructure, disable security controls, steal information, and commit financial fraud 
(CyberArk, 2014; NetIQ, 2015).   
To address threats related to privileged users, products like CyberArk and NetIQ 
provide a method to store privileged users’ passwords in a vault and allow a policy to be 
defined to identify who can access the passwords and under what circumstances.  
Privileged user management products monitor privileged user sessions, can record a 
privileged user’s actions, and have the ability to detect malicious activity by privileged 
users.  Companies also can eliminate hard-coded passwords in applications using 
privileged user management technology.  Taking into account privileged user 
management product claims, security incidents could decrease.   
Researchers are looking for ways to detect internal attacks.  Alsuhibany, Morisset, 
and van Moorsel (2013) developed a model called Attacker Learning Curve to monitor 
privileged users who are engaging in malicious activities.  The model records attempts to 
access computer resources that utilize an unsupervised learning algorithm.     
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Bau, Bursztein, Gupta, and Mitchell (2010) studied existing black-box application 
vulnerability testing solutions to identify opportunities for improved capabilities to locate 
security vulnerabilities in applications.  Bau et al. reported that there are over 50 products 
commercially available to scan and identify application vulnerabilities that are approved 
by the PCI-DSS council.  The PCI-DSS council is an open global forum launched in 2006 
that leads the development, management, education, and awareness of the Payment Card 
Industry Security Standard.  The five founding members are American Express, Discover, 
JCB International, MasterCard, and Visa (PCI Security Standards Council, 2006).   
Nair, Drew, and Verderber (2009) identified the requirement to analyze applications 
for security vulnerabilities.  The highest risks are applications that are exposed externally, 
where users and hackers outside the company have access to the application.  These 
applications are referred to as web facing (Nair et al., 2009).  Eliminating application 
vulnerabilities of web-facing applications can decrease a company’s risk of cyber attack 
(IBM, 2014a) as well as decrease the opportunity for a security incident by reducing 
application vulnerabilities for hackers to exploit.   
The third research question provided insights into understanding how new and 
expanding use of IT related to security incidents and breaches.  The interview questions 
focused on the expanded use of mobile devices and the use of cloud services.  
Surprisingly, none of the interview participants mentioned any security incidents and 
breaches related to mobile computing or the use of cloud services.  In almost every 
interview, the participants explained how they utilized MDM and containerization 
technology to ensure the security controls and the data protection on the mobile device. 
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The Verizon breach report (2015) indicated that out of the tens of millions of mobile 
devices, only 0.03% of the devices had malicious exploits.   
The majority of the interview participants viewed external cloud services as more 
secure than their internal infrastructure.  A common theme was that the participants did 
extensive reviews of external cloud service providers, and companies sanctioned and 
controlled communication to only approved cloud service providers.  Several participants 
indicated they used information security technology to monitor and prevent connections 
to unauthorized cloud service providers.   
For those interview participants who considered external cloud services more secure 
than internal infrastructure, many believed that one of the reasons external cloud services 
were more secure was the simplicity of the cloud service vs. the complexity of their 
internal infrastructure.  Based on the interviews, mobile technology and cloud services 
did not seem to increase security incidents and breaches.  The lack of increased security 
incidents in the mobile and cloud space could be related to two reasons.  One reason, 
several interview participants mentioned, was the lack of visibility into the cloud services 
infrastructure.  A security incident or breach could be occurring at the cloud service 
provider, and the company might be unaware of it.  The second reason there may be a 
lack of security incidents is that the companies interviewed utilized multiple information 
technologies to decrease their risk of information security incidents and breaches in the 
cloud.  Examples of IT security utilized were encryption, and controls on usage of 
external cloud services. One interview participant indicated they did not utilize any cloud 
services.  
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Kothari (2013) explained that cloud technologies carry increased risk, especially for 
financial companies that hold large amounts of regulated data, such as bank account 
numbers, social security numbers, and health information.  NIST (2010) defines personal 
identifiable information (PII) as information that, if exposed, could cause negative impact 
to a person.  Examples of PII, as defined by NIST, are passport numbers, driver license 
numbers, social security numbers, financial information, and biometric data.  To combat 
the increased risk when using cloud technologies, Kothari (2013) suggested encrypting 
user data both in transit and at rest; retaining encryption keys; deploying DLP techniques, 
such as software that looks for specific keywords; and utilizing malware detection 
techniques, such as anti-virus software and intrusion prevention systems.  Encryption of 
company data and retention of the encryption keys are important because cloud providers 
may have access to the data.  If the data are encrypted, the information will not be able to 
be deciphered by the cloud service provider, provided that the cloud service provider 
does not have access to the encryption keys.  Companies that use cloud services need to 
be aware of the location of the data to ensure that privacy laws are being complied with 
when data are being transported across country boundaries (Kothari, 2013). 
Mobile computing continues to grow and creates additional security threats that need 
to be considered.  Mobile applications are often inexpensive and easy to buy (Li & Clark, 
2013) but are vulnerable to malware or to a hacker’s gaining access by rooting or 
jailbreaking the device (bypassing the device’s security controls; Li & Clark, 2013).  
Mobile security products exist to provide content containers to separate personal and 
business data, monitor the security health of the device, and provide secure encrypted 
email.  A few of the companies that provide security products for mobile devices are 
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Good (2014) and AirWatch (2014).  Lookout is an anti-virus vendor for Android mobile 
devices (Lookout, 2014).  Trend Micro Mobile Device Security blocks phishing and 
malicious websites for iPhones and iPads (Trend Micro, 2015).  However, even with 
additional security technology, threats exist.  German security researcher Andreas Kurtz 
discovered a flaw with the Apple iPhone and iPad that allows the hacker to bypass the 
security controls and obtain access to email attachments (Pagliery, 2014). Even though 
this vulnerability has since been fixed by Apple, it is an example of the ongoing 
challenge researchers and hackers take on to search for product vulnerabilities.          
The last research question concerned the effectiveness of threat-sharing forums.  All 
interview participants were members of FS-ISAC, and many identified additional threat-
sharing forums they were involved in.  Surprisingly, there were consistent comments 
from the interview participants on the limited value of threat-sharing forums.  There was 
only one interview participant who identified a specific targeted situation in which the 
information provided by FS-ISAC prevented an attack.  Four of the nine participants 
identified intelligence around DDOS attacks helped them prevent a security incident. 
There was a consistent theme that the information from FS-ISAC was a huge amount of 
data, and their companies struggled to consume the information.   
The feedback from the nine Fortune 500 financial services individuals interviewed 
indicated that there was a question regarding the effectiveness of the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015, passed by Congress (U.S. Congress, 2015).  A 
requirement of the cybersecurity legislation is to request the Department of Homeland 
Security develop procedures to share cybersecurity threat information with private 
entities.  A few of the interview participants indicated they were in the early 
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implementation stage of automated updating  of threat indicators into their enterprise 
security systems; future research could explore the readiness of different industries to 
intake  threat indicators.  FS-ISAC is a leader in working to solve the issue of consuming 
large amounts of threat information and has partnered with DTCC to create a new 
company with a mission to provide automation and services to aid the automatic updating 
of threat information into existing security controls (Soltra, 2015).  
Threat intelligence services provide information about attackers and their methods of 
hacking (Wilson, 2013).  The exchange of threat information among and between 
financial services companies through FS-ISAC (2013a) and government agencies may 
have the potential to affect the number of incidents or breaches.  There are multiple 
groups that share threat information.  FS-ISAC requires financial services companies to 
join FS-ISAC, by paying a membership fee, to gain access to the information.  The cost 
of the membership is a sliding scale, depending on the services bought and the size of the 
financial institution.   
Free threat-information sharing services are used to gain knowledge of security 
threats.  The U.S. CERT (2014) provides information free of charge to companies and 
individuals.  InfraGard (2015) is a free service that the FBI provides after the applicant is 
vetted.  InfraGard has over 80 chapters and serves 16 critical infrastructure segments.  
Threat information also can be integrated with security information and event 
management solutions (Lemos, 2013).  Intelligence sharing and acting on the intelligence 
are important to combating cyber threats (Mandiant, 2013).   
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Strengths 
The high response rate was the strength of this study.  Although there were nine 
interview participants, two additional individuals refused to participate because their 
company policy prohibited signing the consent form.  Two other individuals agreed to 
participate and provided signed consent forms, but they could not make time in their 
scheduled to be interviewed.   There is a general reluctance to participate in information 
security research, which leads to typical low response rates to security research, unless 
there is an established relationship with the surveyed organizations.  For example, 
Heikkila (2009) distributed a Web-based survey to 1,123 Information Legal Technology 
Association members and received 88 valid responses, a 7.83% valid response rate.  The 
research by Doherty and Fulford (2005) surveyed 2,838 people, with a 7.7% valid 
response rate.  Wiant (2005) surveyed 2,500 people, with a 5.6% response rate.  Finding 
willing participants was an integral part of this research.   
Within a week of the interview, notes from the interview were transcribed and mailed 
them to each participant.  Interview participants were instructions to provide feedback if 
they would like any corrections or changes made. One correction was received from an 
interview participant. The participants interviewed were involved in conferences or 
events where introductions happened, which may indicate some shared interest or profile.     
Weaknesses 
There could be a bias on the part of the author or the participants.  Interactions with 
the interview participants existed prior to the interviews. The interaction spanned from 
one prior interaction to many interactions over several years.  There is also a possibility 
of participant bias, as the participants were approached at an external activity (outside the 
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company) in which both parties were involved.  There is a possibility that Fortune 500 
financial services companies that were not approached could have a different point of 
view, not captured in the case study results.  Because there was some interaction with 
every participant prior to the interview, there could have been bias in the design of the 
questions, the method of interviewing, or the recording of answers.   
Limitations  
The results of this case study may have limited applicability to other populations, as 
the financial services industry is highly regulated.  In addition, the levels of information 
security regulations are different across industry segments; thus, the results from this case 
study may be different in other industry segments.  Further, the participants in this study 
were from the financial services sector, but none were from the top 20 Fortune 500 
companies.  There is a possibility that the largest financial sector companies could have a 
different perspective than was captured in this case study.           
 
Implications and Recommendations 
Many regulations are focused on the reporting of data breaches (Mintz Levin, 2015; 
National Conference of State Legislators, 2013; Singer, 2013; Stevens, 2012; U.S. 
Department of HHS, 2013b).  Proposed legislation is focused on more aggressive sharing 
of IOCs by the U.S. government with the private sector.  This case study may lead to 
further research, such as whether companies should be viewed more positively by 
regulators when a company has a solid security program and a reputation for finding and 
responding to security incidents or breaches.  Should quickly finding and resolving a 
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security incident or breach be viewed more positively than being informed by a 3
rd
 party 
that a breach has occurred?  
Financial services companies have a highly mature ISAC in which to participate.  The 
participants consistently highlighted that keeping up with the FS-ISAC threat intelligence 
feeds was challenging.  FS-ISAC and the DTCC are working to develop more automated 
methods to consume the threat intelligence feeds.  Additional research could explore 
whether the government needs to focus on the ability of companies to effectively utilize 
threat feed information in addition to improving the sharing of IOCs and threat 
information.  Research also could be conducted to determine the effectiveness of 
automated consumption of threat information.  Further, as this study was focused on the 
financial services sector, future research could consider other industry sectors and their 
associated ISACs.    
The Fortune 500 financial services interview participants were CISOs or information 
security leaders in their companies.  It is possible that there is a different perspective on 
the applicability of threat intelligence information to prevent or stop a security breach, 
namely, from the technical team who consume the daily threat intelligence feeds.  Future 
research could study the perspectives of technical security team leaders, for example, 
security operations center managers.   
This case study had the participants focus on the last three years of new investments.  
Future research could consider the total inventory of security technology utilized.  The 
focus on detection vs. prevention information security technology may show a different 
balance of investment and focus if the entire set of capabilities were considered.     
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Several of the interview participants indicated they considered vetted and approved 
cloud service to be more secure than their internal infrastructure because the cloud 
service provider’s security capabilities were robust, and the security architecture was less 
complex than their internal infrastructure.  Most of the participants were new to utilizing 
cloud services.  Future research could consider how information security risk changes as 
companies grow their utilization of cloud services, as well as how resilient the corporate 
enterprise is as multiple cloud services providers are used.   
Cadregari and Cutaia (2011) identified some of the security risks related to cloud 
technology to be data protection, data disposal, physical controls, access controls, logical 
controls, and reporting obligations.  This research focused on the increase or decrease of 
the detection of security incidents and breaches related to utilizing cloud services.  Future 
research could explore the perceived strength or weakness of cloud services to internal 
infrastructure relating to data protection, data disposal, physical controls, access controls, 
logical controls, and reporting obligations.       
Miyamoto (2013) identified people as the weakest link in information security.  
Several interview participants identified their security staff as critical in identifying a 
security issue or breach that technology missed.  Future research could analyze the type 
of security incidents that are missed by technology and detected by humans. Another 
future research opportunity could explore what skills security professionals need for a 
greater likelihood of finding security incidents that technology misses.  Another possible 
research topic could be to study the necessary staffing levels and time spent to look for 
security anomalies to effectively find security incidents for a specific industry sector.   
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Summary of the Study 
Cyber security is a major focus of the government and companies today.  Results 
from a survey conducted by PwC (2015) on the state of information security showed that 
there was a 38% increase in the security incidents detected, while information security 
budgets grew by 24% in 2015 as compared to 2014.  The U.S. Congress passed a cyber 
security bill that requires more aggressive cyber intelligence information to be shared 
between the government and private sector (U.S. Congress, 2015).  U.S. government 
regulators, for example, the FFIEC (2015b), are holding board of directors responsible 
for the cyber security capabilities of the institutions they oversee.   
This case study explored the information security technology related to an increased 
awareness and a decrease in information security incidents and breaches focused 
specifically on the financial services industry.  The research also explored the case study 
participants’ views of threat indicator sharing.  This research could provide companies, 
government agencies, and ISACs with insights into the perspectives and challenges of 
Fortune 500 financial services information security leaders, as companies address the 
challenges of improving information security capabilities and reducing the possibility of 
an information security breach.   
Wiant (2005), Doherty and Fulford (2005), and Heikkila (2009) explored the 
relationship between security policies and data security breaches, and the findings of all 
three investigations demonstrated that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between having a security policy and realizing a reduction in data security breaches.  The 
goal of this study, however, was to look at the increase or decrease of security 
information and breaches from the perspective of IT and not the existence of a security 
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policy.  Heikkila observed in her dissertation that some of the firms with increased 
detection of security breaches had superior information security technology.  She 
suggested further research to explore how IT security corresponded to an increased 
awareness of security incidents and breaches.  This case study expanded on Heikkila’s 
proposal for further research by considering four research questions: 
RQ 1: What type of information security products result in an increased detection of 
security incidents and breaches?     
RQ 2: What types of security information technology result in a decrease of security 
incidents and breaches?    
RQ 3: How have new technologies, for example, cloud and mobile technologies, 
resulted in an increase or decrease in data security incidents and breaches, and has the 
technology strengthened or weakened enterprise security?    
RQ 4: To what extent can participation in threat-information sharing groups, or threat 
intelligence information sharing, increase awareness of security incidents and breaches?     
This research topic was very relevant over the course of the study.  Breaches 
continued to occur, making major media headlines.  Some noteworthy breaches in 2015 
included Anthem’s loss of 80 million records, CareFirst Blue Cross Blue Shield’s breach 
of 1.1 million records, Premera’s breach of 11 million records, Excellus Blue Cross Blue 
Shield’s loss of 10 million records, the Experian breach of 15 million records, 
ScottTrade’s breach of 4.5 million records, the IRS breach of over 700,000 individuals’ 
records, and the U.S. Office of Personal Management’s breach of 21.5 million records 
(Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015).   
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Insurance, financial, and government sectors experienced major breaches in 2015.  
Ironically, information security breaches grew as spending on information security 
increased (PwC, 2015).  The U.S. government advanced cyber security legislation, 
looking for ways to improve the cyber security capabilities of the country.  In 2013, 
President Obama signed an executive order aimed at improving the country’s cyber 
readiness (White House, 2013).  Part of the executive order tasked NIST with producing 
a new standard for critical infrastructure to improve the cyber protections of companies 
(NIST, 2014a).  Congress also passed a cyber security bill that required more aggressive 
cyber intelligence information sharing between the government and private sector (U.S. 
Congress, 2015).   
Continued breaches and increased government oversight demonstrated the lack of any 
specific solution to eliminate information security breaches.  This research focused on 
providing insight into how financial services information security leaders viewed IT and 
threat intelligence sharing as tools to provide increased awareness and decrease 
information security incidents and breaches.  Nine information security leaders of 
Fortune 500 financial services companies were interviewed.  Interviews lasted 
approximately one hour.  Notes were recorded from the interview and provided a record 
of the notes to the participants, allowing them to suggest any changes or corrections.  
Using Yin’s (2014) guidance on case study research, pattern matching and triangulation 
were utilized to provide findings.  Plausible rival explanations were explored.      
The case study revealed several insights.  Using pattern matching, the study 
discovered that there were consistent responses with regard to security technology that 
had been installed in the last three years to provide companies with increased awareness 
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of data security incidents and breaches.  Several participants stated the new technology 
had improved their visibility of security incidents and breaches from months and years to 
hours and days.  There was a consistent view that, without the newer detection 
capabilities they installed, in many cases, the company would have been unaware of the 
security incident.  The most referenced detection technologies mentioned were SIEM, log 
correlation, and malware detection.  The interview participants also saw a decrease in 
security incidents and breaches from information security technology that provided 
prevention capabilities.  The technology mentioned most often was blocking malicious 
web sites, application whitelisting, and DLP.   
Companies are increasing their use of cloud and mobile technologies.  The research 
explored the technologies used by the Fortune 500 financial services companies to secure 
these platforms, and their view of the relative security of these platforms.  Utilizing 
pattern matching, the study noted a consistent theme the interview participants mentioned 
in the interviews, i.e., mobile and cloud platforms were not experiencing security 
incidents and breaches.  Interview participants regularly utilized MDM and 
containerization to reduce the threat of security breaches on mobile devices.  The 
participants interviewed also had strong oversight on use of external cloud services, often 
using IT to monitor usage.  Using pattern matching, it was observed that participants 
mentioned that a cloud service has a more simplistic architecture than their internal 
legacy systems.  Mobile and cloud platforms did not seem to add to security incidents and 
breaches for the companies interviewed.   
All of the interview participants were members of FS-ISAC, and many participated in 
additional threat-information sharing groups.  Using pattern matching, the study 
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determined that most of the participants could not identify specific information they 
received from FS-ISAC that stopped a security breach.  Participants consistently 
mentioned the amount of information they received was overwhelming and hard to keep 
up with.  In a few cases, participants highlighted the intelligence and assistance they 
received from FS-ISAC that pertained to DDOS attacks and how they utilized that 
information to prevent security incidents.  One company identified specific targeted 
information they received from FS-ISAC that prevented a security breach.  A few of the 
participants were in the early stages of using technology to automatically ingest threat 
IOCs.   
Several questions for future research emerged from this case study: Will opinions of 
information security leader’s change with respect to mobile and cloud services if there 
are major breaches reported related to these platforms?  Would information security 
leaders from a different industry segment have similar views?  As the ingestion of IOCs 
advances, do security incidents and breaches decline?  What are the technical challenges 
of automating the ingestion of IOCs?  If the companies interviewed were challenged with 
ingesting the threat sharing information, should the government turn their focus to 
helping companies effectively use the threat information being shared?  What is the 
return on investment of the increased spending on cyber security?  Would the chief 
information officers have a different view of security than the technical leaders of 
information security?  Cyber security provides a wealth of research opportunities.   
Based on this case study, IT security does increase awareness of security incidents 
and breaches.  Information security technology also has the ability to decrease security 
incidents and breaches, and mobile and cloud services do not seem to increase security 
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incidents and breaches.  Companies are overwhelmed with the threat information that 
they are receiving today but believe belonging to an FS-ISAC will give them access to 
valuable information that will help with specific threats and understand threat trends.   
Major data breaches continue to occur while the U.S. government continues to roll 
out regulations and guidance with the purpose of improving cyber security.  As 
adversaries increase their capabilities, and hacking tools continue to change and advance, 
there will continue to be a contest between companies that are trying to secure their 
enterprise and the hackers who are finding new ways to compromise systems.  Sharing 
security threat intelligence, collaborating on security best practices, and conducting 
information security research can be used to advance the cyber defenses of public and 
private industry.     
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Appendix A 
List of Acronyms 
 
APT: Advanced Persistent Threat 
ARRA: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
BYOD: Bring Your Own Device 
CERT: Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
CFPB: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau  
CINS: Critical Infrastructure Notification System  
CISO: Chief Information Security Officer 
CPU: Central Processing Unit 
CSA: Cloud Security Alliance 
DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service 
DLP: Data Loss Prevention 
DMARC: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance   
DKIM: Domain Keys Identified Mail 
DoS: Denial of Service 
DTCC: Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
FFIEC: Federal Financial Institution Examination Council 
FTC: Federal Trade Commission  
FRS: Federal Reserve System 
FS-ISAC: Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
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FSOC: Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Gbps: Gigabits per second 
GLBA: Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
GSCIS: Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences  
HHS: Health and Human Services  
HIPAA: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
IaaS: Infrastructure as a Service 
IC3: Internet Crime Complaint Center 
IDS: Intrusion Detection System 
IOC: Indicators of Compromise  
IP: Internet Protocol 
IPS: Intrusion Prevention System 
IRB: Institution Review Board 
ISAC: Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
ISACA: Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
ISO: International Organization for Standards 
IT: Information Technology 
MAM: Mobile Application Management 
MDM: Mobile Device Management 
NCUA: National Credit Union Administration  
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NISTIR: National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report  
NCCoE: National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 
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OCC: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
PaaS: Platform as a Service 
PCI-DSS: Payment Card Industry-Data Security Standard 
PHI: Protected Health Information 
PI: Personal Information  
PII: Personally Identifiable Information 
RQ: Research Question 
Saas: Software as a Service 
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission  
SIEM: Security Information and Event Management 
SOC: Security Operations Center 
SPF: Sender Policy Framework  
SSC: Security Standards Council 
URL: Uniform Resource Location 
US: United States 
VM: Virtual Machine 
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Appendix B 
Survey Instrument 
 
RQ 1: What type of information security products result in an increased awareness, 
providing you the ability to detect security incidents and breaches?     
 What information security product capabilities have you implemented in the last 
three years that increased your awareness to detect security incidents and 
breaches? 
 
 How has technology allowed you to decrease your company’s security exposures? 
 
 How has technology helped you to detect and react to a threat more quickly?  
 
 Do you think you would have found the threat or compromise without the new 
security technology? 
 
 How has security technology increased your visibility into security incidents and 
breaches? 
 
RQ 2: What types of security information technology result in a decrease of security 
incidents and breaches?    
 What information security product capabilities have you implemented in the last 
three years that decreased your security incidents and breaches? 
 
 How has technology allowed you to decrease your company’s security exposures? 
 
 How has technology helped you react to a threat more quickly? 
 
 Did the technology alone provide decreased security incidents and breaches, or 
identify areas that require your company to make process changes to decrease 
security incidents and breaches?  
 
 How has security technology decreased your security incidents and breaches? 
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RQ 3: How have new technologies, for example, cloud and mobile technologies, 
resulted in an increase or decrease in data security incidents and breaches, and has the 
technology strengthened or weakened enterprise security?    
 What cloud and mobile technologies infrastructure changes have been 
implemented that have security implications in the past three years? 
 
 How have these infrastructure changes increased or decreased security incidents 
and breaches? 
 
 How would you compare (more robust vs. weaker) the security of your mobile 
devices to PCs? 
 
 How has technology been applied to your mobile solutions to decrease the risk of 
security incidents and breaches? 
 
 How would you compare (more robust vs. weaker) the security of your cloud 
services to your on-premise IT solutions?   
 
 How has technology been applied to your cloud services to decrease the risk of 
security incidents and breaches? 
 
RQ 4: To what extent can participation in threat information-sharing groups, or threat 
intelligence information sharing, increase awareness of security incidents and breaches?      
 Do you participate in FS-ISAC or another security threat-sharing forum? 
 
 How has the information from threat-sharing forums decreased security incidents 
and breaches? 
 
 How has the information from threat-sharing forums increased your awareness of 
security incidents and breaches? 
 
 How has your company been able to stop attacks in progress with the information 
that you have gained from threat-sharing forums?  
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Appendix C 
Interview Responses 
 
Interview Question 1A: What information security product capabilities have you 
implemented in the last three years that increased your awareness to detect security 
incidents and breaches? 
A1 
  We have installed threat analytic technology to gain more visibility into attacks 
 
A2  
 Solutions to search for malicious content for web & email. 
 Security incident event management (SIEM) analyzing events across Windows 
OS, IPS, FW 24x7. 
 Forensic endpoint detecting malicious code. 
 Next-generation firewalls inside the network to interrogate internal network 
traffic.   
 Technology to monitor active directory to analyze access rights. 
 
A3 
 DDOS services (to identify if we are being targeted). 
 Advanced malware detection. 
 Data leakage prevention. 
 Detecting large file transfer out of the network.   
 SIEM. 
 Vendor doing advanced scanning of network (use two different vendors, 
swapping back and forth to get different perspectives). 
 
A4 
 Security operations center (SOC). 
 Security incident event management/log analysis. 
 DDOS detection and prevention. 
 Decrypting network traffic to interrogate. 
 Vulnerability scanning. 
 Change audit and threat detection. 
 Scanning traffic leaving enterprise. 
 Threat detection for endpoint. 
 Internet content filtering. 
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A5 
 Network and email threat detection and prevention. 
 Security log analysis. 
 Network monitoring and detection. 
 Professional services to assess our network. 
 Multiple threat feeds. 
 Upgraded IPSs. 
 
A6 
 Sandboxing URLs and binaries. 
 Managed services to monitor network traffic. 
 Services to prevent command and control communication, malware, and phishing. 
 Intrusion detection system (IDS). 
 
A7 
 Network APT detection and prevention. 
 Analyze employee reported SPAM and analyze the infrastructure for similar 
emails. 
 Endpoint technology that opens attachments and websites in a virtual container, 
preventing the endpoint being infected with malware. 
 DLP on network (non-email web traffic). 
 Monitor applications for communication to cloud services, and data transfer 
outside the company.   
 
A8 
 Log aggregation. 
 Service to review system for Indicators of Compromise. 
 
A9 
 
 SIEM/log management. 
 Netflow analysis. 
 IDS. 
 Advanced email scanning, able to detect malicious payloads. 
 Advanced malware behavior detection. 
 Endpoint protections (AV/HIPS/behavior based).   
 
Interview Question 1B: How has technology allowed you to decrease your company’s 
security exposure?  
A1 
 The threat analytic technology has given us greater visibility into attacks.  The 
threats also have increased with a bigger attack surface.  The technology has 
allowed us to keep up vs. decrease the security exposure. 
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A2 
 Yes.  We can track by the number of events that we have a decreasing number of 
incidents (example, fewer workstation and server rebuilds). 
 
A3 
 Yes (hard to quantify). 
 DLP: We see data leaving the business showing broken business processes, that 
we can go back and improve the processes. 
 Being able to stop command and control traffic. 
 
 
A4 
 The technology has provided us better insights into threats that exist 
 
A5 
 We are able to detect and remediate issues that we would have been unaware of. 
 
A6 
 Prior to this newer technology we had only signature based detection, and would 
not have detected several vulnerabilities. 
 
A7 
 We are seeing more details about the security of our infrastructure than we were 
before, and we are able to react more quickly to the information.   
 Not sure we are seeing a decrease, as the attacks are increasing.  It is more like a 
treadmill going faster, and we are trying to keep up.   
 
A8 
 Technology has allowed us to have better insight into what we didn’t know. 
 
A9 
 We have been able to measure improved security through penetration testing 
results. 
 We track 20 critical security controls, and are able to show a decrease in security 
exposures 
 We can show a decrease in security incidents 
 
Interview Question 1C: How has technology helped you detect and react to a threat 
more quickly?  
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A1 
The technology has allowed us to perform quarantining and isolation faster.  The 
technology allows for better correlation of events across more points of detection.  
The technology is not 100% effective, but it provides a better data scientific approach 
to security threats.   
 
A2 
We are finding security issues in days/hours vs. months/years. 
 
A3 
We are picking up threats earlier in the attack. 
 
A4 
Our tools can assess the threat quicker, and we are able to react faster.  There is a lack 
of integration to the tools that makes managing all this information difficult.   
 
A5 
We have greater insights into our environment.  We continue to add new functions 
and technologies to provide better insights into security threats.   
 
A6 
The newer technology allows us to detect and stop attacks earlier in the delivery 
phase of the attack.   
 
A7 
We have more data to detect information about our infrastructure, and to keep up we 
have needed to increase staff to analyze the data and take actions.   
 
A8 
Log correlation and analytics have allowed us to develop rules for anomalies, and 
detect/respond to threats early in the attack cycle. Utilizing a service that searches for 
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) has allowed us to have better optics to understand 
if hackers are inside our network. 
 
A9 
We have dramatically better awareness of issues and can address issues quicker. We 
have been able to anticipate issues and prioritize actions more effectively. 
 
Interview Question 1D: Do you think you would have found the threat or compromise 
without the new security technology?  
A1 
The technology has allowed us to find some threats or compromises that we would 
have not found without it.  In some cases, we would have found the threat or 
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compromise with existing technology, but not as fast.  We were able to detect the 
compromise earlier in the kill chain.   
 
A2 
Probably not in all cases.  We were not able to look or analyze all the security 
information prior to this security technology being implemented.   
 
A3 
Without some of the technology, we would have been oblivious of the attack. Even 
with the technology, sometimes humans pick up cases that the technology does not 
alert on. 
 
A4 
We would have been blind to many of these issues.   
 
A5 
Several of the issues we found, we would not have been aware of without this 
additional security technology.   
 
A6 
No.  The newer technology provided insights we did not have prior.   
 
A7 
In some cases, our legacy capabilities would have found the security issue but, in 
some cases, much later in the attack cycle than we are currently finding the issue. 
  
A8 
We would have found some, but the security services that provide Indicators of 
Compromise scanning has found things our installed technology would not have. 
 
A9 
Our penetration testing demonstrates that we are able to find and resolve security 
issues earlier in the attack cycle.   
 
Interview Question 1E: How has security technology increased your visibility into 
security incidents and breaches?  
A1 
With the technology, we were able to detect some threats or comprises earlier in the 
kill chain or, in other cases, detect when our existing technology would not have 
found the security threat.   
 
A2 
We are able to analyze and have greater visibility into our infrastructure, allowing us 
to react quicker.   
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A3 
DLP has provided insight into broken business processes that we have been able to 
address. Malware scanning by a vendor has been able to pick up malware missed by 
our current anti-virus. 
 
A4 
The tools have been able to detect malware issues and patching gaps that we were 
able to address. 
 
A5 
The new tools have found issues that our old software would not have identified.   
 
A6 
The newer technology allowed us to detect and stop attacks earlier in the kill chain. 
 
A7 
We have much better insight into our network traffic for indicators of concern.   
 
A8 
We have been able to detect and respond to events in almost real time (minutes-hours 
vs. days-months). 
 
A9 
Better defense in depth. Broader coverage at detecting security issues. We better 
understand “normal” and can detect when we are not normal. The insights we have 
gained from the technology has allowed us to make process improvements.  One 
example is, when employees identify SPAM, we are able to analyze quickly if it is 
malicious, quickly analyze our network, and remediate.   
 
  
Interview Question 2A: What information security product capabilities have you 
implemented in the last three years that decreased your security incidents and breaches?  
A1 
 We have implemented technology that allows us to keep up on the latest patching 
information.   
 We have done better matching exploits to our infrastructure, improving the 
effectiveness of our patching program.    
 
A2 
 Blocking malicious web sites. 
 Blocking command and control sites. 
 Dissecting SSL traffic to interrogate for malicious traffic. 
123 
 
 
 Endpoint whitelisting. 
 
A3 
 Privileged user account management/isolation.  
 
 
A4 
 Advanced malware detection, including proactive blocking. 
 Blocking uncategorized websites. 
 DLP (in some cases we block data flow). 
 DLP: We are detecting and changing business processes, but limited blocking. 
 
A5 
 Aggressive IP blocking. 
 DLP. 
 
A6 
 Host intrusion protection systems (HIPS). 
 Data leakage prevention (DLP). 
 eMail protections to analyze and execute opening email attachments or web links 
in a safe container to assess the presence of malware to prevent malicious email 
from entering systems. 
 
A7 
 We run an educational program to help employees identify phishing emails, 
which decreases malware infections. 
 DLP for web traffic is used in monitoring mode. 
 We block malicious and uncategorized websites.  
 Aggressive SPAM filtering. 
 
A8 
 DLP (email, endpoint, and network/gateway). 
 Whitelisting. 
 Next-gen firewalls. 
 Web filtering. 
 Identify anomalous behavior. 
 
A9 
 Application vulnerability scanning. 
 IP blocking (reputation, web site blocking). 
 
Interview Question 2B: How has technology allowed you to decrease your company’s 
security exposure?  
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A1 
We have more quickly and effectively patched the infrastructure in the highest risk 
areas. 
 
A2 
Reduced malware on endpoints/servers. Reduced the threat of an adversary moving 
laterally.  
 
A3 
Decreased malware infections. 
 
A4 
The technology has been able to point out areas that need focus, but we are in the 
early stages to gain all we can from the technology.   
 
A5 
IP blocking has allowed us to prevent security issues by preventing malware and 
reducing data loss vectors.   
 
A6 
We are stopping malicious email at the gateway.   
 
A7 
We have been able to decrease phishing attacks. We have been able to decrease 
malware infections that would have happened when employees visited 
compromised/malicious websites. 
 
A8 
We have been able to detect and respond to user error. We have visibility into events.  
We have been able to identify flawed processes. We are able to block malicious sites. 
 
A9 
Less security defects in code. Fewer malware infections. 
 
Interview Question 2C: How has technology helped you react to a threat more 
quickly?  
A1 
We target patching the key infrastructure better. 
 
A2 
Fewer alerts from SIEM to alert staff of issues. 
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A3 
Technology was often just one part of a blended solution of 
people/process/technology. 
 
A4 
Monitoring DLP traffic has allowed us to understand processes that need to be 
improved.   
 
A5 
DLP has allowed us to understand broken business processes and provided us the data 
to work with the business to remediate.   
 
A6 
We are preventing the attacks.   
 
A7 
Using the technology, we are able to analyze who received a malicious email and 
remediate the threat across the infrastructure. 
 
A8 
We are able to detect issues and prevent malware entering our infrastructure. 
 
A9 
If there are issues from website traffic, we are able to use our information security 
tools to analyze and address faster. 
 
Interview Question 2D: Did the technology alone provide decreased security incidents 
and breaches, or identify areas that require your company to make process changes to 
decrease security incidents and breaches?  
A1 
We have practiced security incident tabletops to improve our process readiness of a 
security incident or breach.   
 
A2 
Alerts to the SIEM allowed the staff to analyze issues and make process changes. 
 
A3 
DLP provided insights to improve the security of business processes. Detecting 
command and control traffic, and blocking traffic cut off security incidents. 
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A4 
With the data we received from DLP, we were able to engage application owners and 
development/operations to improve the processes.  We were able to influence the 
software development life cycle (SDLC). 
 
A5 
IP blocking decreased security incidents. DLP provided insights to change business 
process, leading to improved data security. 
 
A6 
We have utilized the technology to decrease attacks, and have had limited focus on 
process changes.   
 
A7 
The technology allowed us to react faster to threats. Having employees report 
phishing emails to a security mailbox has allowed us to clean up the environment and 
prevent threats from turning into incidents 
   
A8 
We have identified flawed processes with our technology that we have been able to 
improve.   
 
A9 
Having real data about security defects in internally developed code has allowed us to 
gain better partnership with developers to build secure code. 
 
Interview Question 2E: How has security technology decreased your security 
incidents and breaches?  
A1 
Effective patching has decreased security incidents and breaches by decreasing the 
vectors an attacker can penetrate in our systems.   
 
A2 
Can see with metrics that issues and incidents have decreased. We have better 
visibility to understand the effects of an incident and react or learn from the issue. 
 
A3 
Stop attacks in progress.  Improve the security of business processes.   
 
A4 
Security technology has given us better insights into processes we can improve to 
reduce security incidents.   
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A5 
The new security technology we have installed has allowed us to prevent malware 
infections and reduce the chance of unintended data loss.   
 
A6 
We have less malware on endpoints.   
 
A7 
When we find a threat, we are able to assess and remediate prior to the threat 
becoming an incident. We are reducing the number of malware infections entering 
our system. 
 
A8 
We have been able to create semi-automatic blocking of malicious email, reducing 
malware infections. 
 
A9 
We have more secure code being developed. We have fewer malware infections, as 
we are able to prevent through IP blocking 
 
Interview Question 3A: What cloud and mobile technology infrastructure changes 
have been implemented in the past three years that have security implications?  
A1 
Increased third-party hosting and cloud hosting has occurred, for example, cloud 
office suite.   
 
A2 
Increased mobile endpoints. Cloud usage to reduce cost and increase speed 
(examples: HR, CRM). 
 
A3 
We utilize mobile for email/calendar/contacts, but we have few mobile applications. 
Limited cloud usage, unless it has been approved by information security. 
 
A4 
We are using mobile technology more.  We utilize Android and iOS.  We have lots of 
mobile applications. We are quickly deploying cloud services but are in the early 
stages. 
 
A5 
Mobile: Employee enablement.  Cloud: Aggressive adoption. 
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A6 
Mobile: Mail/calendar/contacts and limited applications on mobile.  Cloud: We have 
a policy of cloud first. 
 
A7 
Mobile: We are using more mobile devices to support the business needs.  Cloud: We 
are utilizing more SaaS solutions in the cloud. 
 
 
A8 
For BYOD non-managed devices, we have implemented sandboxing. For cloud, we 
have installed technology to detect any use of public cloud services so we can manage 
corporate use of external IT infrastructure. 
 
A9 
Mobile: BYOD and company owned; MDM and containerization; isolated network 
traffic.  Cloud: Very limited. 
 
Interview Question 3B: How have these infrastructure changes increased or decreased 
security incidents and breaches? 
A1 
We have not seen an increase of security incidents and breaches yet. 
 
A2 
Mobile is a lower threat than Windows endpoints. Cloud has benefits and risks for 
security.  
 
A3 
No substantial changes. We lock down the mobile device with mobile device 
management and container technology. Cloud services go through security 
assessment before they are utilized. 
 
A4 
We invested quite a bit to lock down the mobile devices.  The mobile devices extend 
our attack surface, but we need to support the business with more flexible endpoints.   
 
A5 
Slight increase in risk, but our approach has not created significant risk.   
 
A6 
We have had no evidence of security incidents on mobile or cloud, but I am aware of 
the attack vectors and risks of these platforms. 
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A7 
In both cases, I believe our risks have increased because of the additional technology. 
I have not seen an increase in incidents or breaches for mobile or cloud.  
 
A8 
For mobile, we have implemented MDM and containerization.  Mobile devices are 
employee owned. For laptops, the majority are owned  company owned.  If BYOD, 
they have a virtual connection to the company. 
 
A9 
We have not seen any increase of security incidents. 
 
Interview Question 3C: How would you compare (more robust vs. weaker) the 
security of your mobile devices to PCs?  
A1 
We have more control over the mobile device with MDM and containerization  
technology.  
To date, we don’t have custom mobile applications.   
 
A2 
We use an MDM and have limited application development on mobile devices. No 
containerization. Ecosystem on mobile is much cleaner and more simple than 
Windows. 
 
A3 
We have seen little Android malware entering our enterprise. More robust.  
 
A4 
PCs have a greater number of users. Users of PCs have a greater chance of being 
social engineered, leading to a security incident. Mobile is more locked down.  
 
A5 
PCs have more security technology, providing more robust controls. Mobile has 
many fewer features and more locked down. 
 
A6 
I see the risk of PCs and Mobile devices as the same.  Both have access to 
information within the company network.   
 
A7 
For PCs, we allow users to have administrative rights.  Our PCs have many more 
controls, but the threat vector is larger on PCs than mobile devices. There are limited 
functions enabled on mobile devices. I think the controls are proportional to the risks. 
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A8 
I see both mobile and PCs as having strong security.  Corporate devices are locked 
down.  Off-shore and BYOD are set up with virtual connections.   
 
A9 
PCs are more secure.  We have locked down PCs.  We utilize virtualization, 
encryption, and elimination of admin rights to lock down PCs.  On mobile devices, 
users can install applications, and we have less visibility into network traffic 
 
Interview Question 3D: How has technology been applied to your mobile solutions to 
decrease the risk of security incidents and breaches?  
A1 
The data that is stored currently is only mail/calendar/contacts.  We have MDM and 
MCM technology to protect the data on the mobile devices. 
 
A2 
MDM provides security functions. Limited functions reduce chance of security 
issues. 
 
A3 
We lock down the mobile device with mobile device management and container 
technology. 
 
A4 
We have installed MDM, containerization, and do application vulnerability scanning 
for mobile applications.   
 
A5 
The MDM and containerization provides a strong platform for managing the security 
of our mobile device. 
 
A6 
We have MDM and containerization.   
 
A7 
We have an MDM and no container. We have a mobile security solution that prevents 
malware and targeted attacks.  
 
A8 
With PCs and mobile devices, we have locked them down so you cannot copy data or 
move data outside container.  
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A9 
MDM allows us to manage the security health of the mobile device. Containerization 
provides protection from data loss. 
 
Interview Question 3E: How would you compare (more robust vs. weaker) the 
security of your cloud services to your on-premise IT solutions?  
A1 
Weaker.  There is lack of visibility to security due diligence.  We lost control and 
oversight.   
 
A2 
Mixed. It depends on the security of the Cloud Service provider. Cloud services could 
provide more security because you are not concentrating all your IT capabilities  
within your in-house infrastructure. If a company uses multiple cloud providers, and 
one cloud provider is compromised, it would not stop all processing/work.  
A3 
More robust. Cloud solutions have less complex systems because they don’t need to 
deal with legacy systems. Cloud systems have better encryption. We are dependent on 
what the cloud provider tells you vs. direct oversight. 
 
A4 
If cloud services are implemented correctly, they can provide more robust security.  
Poor governance can lead to weaker cloud security.  Our goal is to enable developers 
to use secure cloud services.   
 
A5 
For the cloud solutions we have approved, the security is stronger.  Cloud solutions 
provide the ability to spin up a secure workload quickly.   
 
A6 
I see similar levels of risk between on-premise and cloud solutions, especially if the 
workload is lift-and-shifted to the cloud. We already outsource our IT to a third party, 
so moving to the cloud was not a change in risk. 
 
A7 
Today, we are only using SaaS solutions.  We have corporate governance over use of 
SaaS solutions and have monitoring of cloud service. Cloud solutions are similar risk 
to providing  company data to a third-party. 
 
A8 
For cloud services, we have strong policies and processes, we manage the use of 
external cloud services, and we encrypt the data.  I see cloud (both internally hosted 
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and externally hosted) as more secure, as it is less complex than the legacy 
infrastructure.   
 
A9 
We have not implemented public cloud solutions. 
 
Interview Question 3F: How has technology been applied to your cloud services to 
decrease the risk of security incidents and breaches?  
 
A1 
The cloud has more threats and incidents.  There is limited technology to decrease the 
risks, but I expect more to come in the future.  I have not installed specific security 
technology to the cloud environment.   
 
A2 
Technology has been applied between our company infrastructure and the cloud 
provider to detect security issues/threats. 
 
A3 
Cloud systems are not used unless sanction and approved by information security. 
Cloud systems we are utilizing have strong security systems. 
A4 
We are in the early stages, and are carefully evaluating cloud services for security.   
 
A5 
We define specific cloud solutions that are approved by information security.  
Information security performs detailed analysis and provides governance when using 
cloud services. All data are encrypted in the cloud. 
 
A6 
Cloud services provide good security capabilities; the key is how the application 
utilizes the security capabilities offered by cloud services. Commercial cloud services 
have a better security design, testing, and external security certifications than 
internally developed infrastructure.  
 
A7 
We have security solutions that monitor use of cloud solutions. We have limited 
visibility of the security of SaaS cloud solutions. 
   
A8 
Encryption of data. Monitoring use of public cloud services. 
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A9 
We have not implemented public cloud solutions. 
 
Interview Question 4A: Do you participate in FS-ISAC or another security threat 
sharing forum?  
A1 
Yes. 
 
A2 
Yes. 
 
A3 
Yes. 
 
A4 
Yes. 
 
A5 
Yes.  We participate in about 50 threat feeds. 
 
A6 
Yes, we belong to FS-ISAC and InfraGard. 
 
A7 
Yes. 
 
A8 
Yes.  We belong to FS-ISAC and Department of Homeland Security.  We pay for 
vendor threat feeds.   
 
A9 
Yes. 
 
Interview Question 4B: How has the information from threat sharing forums 
decreased security incidents and breaches?  
A1 
At the highest level, very little.  We receive the threat information from multiple other 
sources.   
 
A2 
Limited value.  Less actionable intelligence.  Too many emails/alerts. Better 
awareness in general about financial services attacks. 
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A3 
We proactively block malware with the threat intelligence we receive. 
 
A4 
There is too much data.  There is a need for automation.  Today, we manually need to 
analyze too much data.  The threat information requires technical talent to make 
judgments on the information.  The information does provide intelligence to decrease 
threats, but it takes too much effort to analyze.   
 
A5 
The threat intelligence feeds allow us to incorporate security controls based on 
Indicators of Compromise, but there is too much data.  The threat intelligence data are 
hard to manage.  It is difficult to sort out the critical and relevant information.   
 
A6 
We find limited value because the amount of information is too much to analyze and 
consume.   
 
A7 
We react to FS-ISAC data constantly, for example, block IP addresses. 
 
A8 
We analyze and respond with the data we receive from the threat feeds and our 
relationships with peer companies.   
 
A9 
Absolutely. We use the information (Indicators of Compromise) to detect and prevent 
security issues. We have gained insights into wire-transfer scams to allow us to 
prevent them.   
 
Interview Question 4C: How has the information from threat sharing forums 
increased your awareness of security incidents and breaches?  
A1 
Day to day, we receive very little unique information.  The information I gain from 
FS-ISAC at a macro level on threats have been more helpful.   
 
A2 
Not much. Too much data. Until automated threat sharing is implemented, it is too 
hard to consume. 
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A3 
We improved our DDOS controls after receiving insight from FS-ISAC. My team 
gains value from the professional exchanges they have with other members in FS-
ISAC. 
 
A4 
The information provided by the threat sharing forums have provided us better 
viability and allowed us to take action to respond to the threat.   
 
A5 
Threat information, for example, the increased DDOS threat, allows us to improve 
our defenses.   
 
A6 
The information has been too much to be useful.   
 
A7 
The data FS-ISAC provides us gives us greater insight into general attacks happening 
within the financial sector. We have been able to respond with additional security 
controls  from information shared about the attacks against the banking sector. 
 
A8 
The threat information allows us to keep an eye forward to the next set of threats.  We 
gain from information we share with other companies within the sharing forums. We 
have added hunting activities to our security operations center. 
 
A9 
We have been able to use information from FS-ISAC to educate the business, 
reducing incidents.   
 
Interview Question 4D: How has your company been able to stop attacks in progress 
with the information that you have gained from threat-sharing forums?  
A1 
Rarely.  We do incorporate Indicators of Compromise, but the information we receive 
is not specifically useful to the company.   
 
A2 
We are able to react to threat information. Information does not allow us to be 
proactive. Too many emails. It is hard to find useful data. 
 
A3 
I am not aware of any attack in progress we have stopped with FS-ISAC threat 
intelligence.   
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A4 
Yes.  We were involved in two major sporting events.  The threat information shared 
for those events were very actionable, and we were able to update our security 
controls daily to respond to the threats.   
 
A5 
Yes.  After we received intelligence on DDOS attacks from FS-ISAC, we were able 
to improve our defenses.   
 
A6 
The information has not helped us stop attacks.  No ability to react to the 
hundreds/thousands of Indicators of Compromise. What the industry needs is a good 
intelligence management system, which I don’t think the vendors have solved yet. 
 
A7 
I have no evidence that any information received from FS-ISAC stopped a specific 
attack against our company. 
 
Today, humans process the information from FS-ISAC.  We are working on early 
stages to automate the consumption of the threat intelligence. 
 
A8 
I am not aware of any specific attacks we have stopped. We are in early stages to use 
STIX and TAXII to automate the ingestion of the threat indicators. We apply all 
Indicators of Compromise to our infrastructure. 
 
A9 
I am not sure we have stopped a specific attack. We have used the information 
provided by FS-ISAC to defend against DDOS attacks.  We improved our defenses.  
When there was a raised threat, we added additional controls.   
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